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Subsidies have long been regarded as a controversial issue as a 
representative non-tariff barrier under the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The European Union (EU) has been involved in 40 disputes as a complainant or 
respondent over 109 cases on subsidies and countervailing measures disputes 
under the WTO dispute settlement. The EU subsidy issues are the second 
highest level of involvement in trade disputes, following the United States, 
which recorded a total of 64 disputes. This research explains a mechanism of 
EU trade remedy actions against subsidies with an empirical analysis on the EU 
subsidies and countervailing measures over the period of 1995, when the WTO 






This paper was fundamentally conducted on the basis of statistical data, 
a report and preceding research on a relevant issue. First, the study analyzed 
whether subsidies and countervailing measures disputes of the EU in the WTO 
tends to concentrate on any countries or products. Second, the research 
independently investigated the specificity and characters of countervailing 
measures, which were initiated and imposed based on its own initiative called 
the EU anti-subsidy rules. As a result, the subsidy disputes of the EU showed 
significant correlativity on specificity concerning the targeted country and 
product. Third, we clearly verified that the ad-valorem duty was 
overwhelmingly used rather than a specific duty for the measures by the 
European Commission (EC) according to the types and characters of the 
targeted product. 
This dissertation ultimately is aimed to serve three different purposes 
through a sophisticated analysis: 1) comprehension for articles of Agreement of 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in the WTO and anti-subsidy rules in 
the EC; 2) verification and validation of specificity for initiations and measures 
on subsidy related disputes with data from the WTO and EC; and 3) analysis on 
the characters of countervailing duties imposed on trade partners. Strongly 
supported with implications from an actual case study, the conclusions will help 
to understand internal and external backgrounds of disputes. Also, the 
dissertation will contribute to predict further possible trade disputes regarding 
the subsidy issue with the EU, partner of the free trade agreement and the third 
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1.1 Research Objective and Contribution  
 
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which have controlled the world trade 
system since 1947, there has been a consistent decrease of trade barriers for the 
purpose of the proliferation of free trade. However, it is noteworthy that non-
tariff barriers such as domestic regulations and technical barriers are criticized 
to undermine free trade rules under the WTO. Among the various non-tariff 
barriers, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) is one of the most 
debated issues. The imposition of countervailing measures against subsidies has 
been disciplined by the WTO agreement called ‘Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures’. However, this remedy action has long been 
controversial among the WTO members due to ambiguous and imprecise 
guidelines. In addition, despite strict regulations to guarantee compliance with 
WTO subsidy rules, the actual implementation of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) judgment to remove violated subsidy programs is not working 
properly and effectively.  
The SCM disputes under the WTO have been frequently and 
predominantly generated by only a few nations. The European Union (EU) is 





the total number of disputes and frequency. However, only a few preceding 
studies have been conducted in South Korea (hereafter, Korea). Also, the 
relevant issue failed to be magnified as a controversy compare to anti-dumping 
and other subject matters even though many member countries directly and 
indirectly still grant different types of subsidies to their domestic industries and 
firms.  
In this context, the main objective of this dissertation can be explained 
to enhance the understanding of subsidies by offering lucid definitions that are 
defined by the provisions of the WTO and EU anti-subsidy rules. Especially, for 
an in-depth study regarding SCM Agreement of the WTO, this research first 
explains the definition of financial contribution, categories of subsidies and 
dispute settlement procedures. Indeed, EU anti-subsidy rules are in many 
respects a trustworthy reflection of the relevant WTO rules. Accordingly, 
examining WTO anti-subsidy rules need to be considered before scrutinizing 
the specifics of EU legislation.  
Second, this study aims to analyze the trends regarding EU SCM 
disputes as both complainant and respondent in the WTO. The analysis of the 
SCM disputes cases during the twenty-one year period (1995-2015) in this 
research will describe whether the disputes were targeted on any specific 
countries or industries by sorting out the number of SCM initiations and 
impositions of countervailing measures in each category. In addition, the 
analysis, will examine subsidy disputes of the EU involving major industries of 





against the EU when looking into the trade pattern between Korea and the EU 
and identify the existence of any certain types of products or services that the 
EU sensitively disputed under the SCM Agreement. 
Third, the EU initiates investigations with its own regulation, based on 
the EU anti-subsidy rules. Accordingly, we examine both initiations and 
measures by the EU itself. For the analysis, statistical data from the EC anti-
subsidy measures list and WTO semi-annual report were used. In the relevant 
chapter, the countries were categorized into four different groups and we 
analyzed the trend of countervailing initiations and measures by targeted 
country, product, and types of measures imposed by the EU. The results will 
contribute to verify if any particular countries or products are more frequently 
targeted than any other. In addition, the outcomes, will explain the 
characteristics of anti-subsidy measures applied for the trade counterpart.  
Consequently, the empirical analysis of the EU SCM disputes under the 
agreement will contribute to provide percipient knowledge with explicit 
explanations regarding the disputes and outcomes. These are all indispensable 
elements for better understanding of the background and chronological pattern 
of the conflicts by targeted countries and industrial sectors. The results of this 
research would be a great contribution in anticipating further trade disputes on 









OVERVIEW OF SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
 
2.1 Formulations of the Definition of Subsidy  
 
The provision of GATT 1947 did not include a clear definition of 
subsidy. The only rules dealing with subsidies essentially were Article XVI 
GATT 1947, providing for notification of and consultations on subsidies, and 
Article VI GATT 1947, allowing the imposition of countervailing measures.
1
 
Neither of these provisions contained a definition of subsidy but only referred 
to the term subsidy.
2
 With respect to the meaning of the word ‘subsidies’, a 
large majority of the experts considered that it covered only subsidies granted 
by governments or by semi-governmental bodies.
3
 However, some experts 
considered that the word should be interpreted in a wider sense and felt that it 
covered all subsidies, whatever their character and whatever their origin, 
including also subsidies granted by private bodies.
4
 
From the beginning, the consistent reading of the term subsidy has been 
quite extensive.
5
 The Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, for instance, mentioned 
some ‘examples of possible forms of subsidies’, encompassing ‘government 
                                            
1
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 Rubini, Luca, ‘The definition of subsidy and state aid: WTO and EC law in comparative 









financing of commercial enterprises, including grants, loans or guarantees; 
government provision or government financed provision of utility supply 
distribution and other operational or support services or facilities; government 
financing of research and development programs; fiscal incentives; and 
government subscription to, or provision of, equity capital’.
6
 
In addition, it was debated that whether more complex regulatory 
mechanisms such as environmental or labor standard could be included in the 
notion of the subsidy,
7
 it seems that, despite its comprehensive nature, the 
GATT concept of the subsidy was limited to measures involving a clear transfer 
of economic resources and in the case of action through intermediaries, 
requiring close involvement of the government.
8
 This is the interpretation made 
by an early panel and confirmed prior to the Uruguay Round by the group of 
the experts on the calculation of the amount of the subsidies, which noted that: 
There can be no subsidy in the absence of a financial contribution of the 
government. There is a necessary link between a subsidy and taxation function 
of government, exercised either directly or delegate to other, private bodies.
9
 
In particular, the concept of ‘financial contribution’, construed with 
references to the link with the ‘taxation function of the government’ clearly 
                                            
6
 Rubini, Luca, ‘The definition of subsidy and state aid: WTO and EC law in comparative 
perspective’, Oxford University Press (2009), pp.105-106. 
7
 Pro M Bronckers and R Quick, ‘What is a Countervailable Subsidy under EEC Trade Law?’, 
(1989) 6 Journal of World Trade 5, 22; A O’Brian, ‘Countervailing Low Wage Subsidies: A 
Counter to the Leveling of Labor Conditions’ (1994) 4 Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems 825; contra M Benitah, The Law of Subsidies under the GATT/WTO System (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p.68. 
8
 Rubini, Luca, ‘The definition of subsidy and state aid: WTO and EC law in comparative 







hints at the form of intervention involving a quite defined transfer of economic 
resources connected with the sovereign right of governments to collect revenue 
and spend it.’
10
 These correspond to the most commonly accepted form of 
subsidy. On the other hand, the rule of imputability of the form of indirect 
action shows a particularly tight degree of government involvement by using 
the term ‘delegation’. What emerges therefore is that in the GATT there was a 
certain agreement that only clear and established form of financial assistance 
would be covered in the definition of the subsidy with the exclusion of more 
complex form of regulatory measures. 
Traditionally, the GATT has been more hostile to export than to 
domestic subsidies for several reasons.
11
 First, as export subsidy appears 
aggressive, especially to an importing country facing serious market disruption 
from imports.
12
 Second, export subsidies help national products climb foreign 
tariff walls. Such subsidies may thus seem to subvert the legitimate tariff policy 
of an importing country.
13
 Third, an export subsidies, as an intervention 
confined to the trade sector, is equivalent to a negative tariff, it clashes with the 
efficiency goals of liberal trade.
14
 It distorts resource allocation and, by 
opening a gap in price between export and domestic sales, also distorts 
                                            
10
 Rubini, Luca, ‘The definition of subsidy and state aid: WTO and EC law in comparative 
perspective’, Oxford University Press (2009), pp.106-107. 
11
 Barcelo, John J, ‘Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping after the Tokyo Round', 














The Uruguay Round, which was more ambitious than the Tokyo 
Round and all the original GATT articles were up for review.
16
 The Final Act 
Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade 
Negotiations, adopted on 15 December 1993, comprises more than 50 legal 
texts, including an agreement establishing World Trade Organization (WTO), an 
Agreement on Agriculture (AG), and an Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM).
17
 The most important achievement of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations can be described as the inclusion in the SCM 
Agreement of a definition of ‘subsidy’.
18
 The definition in Article 1 contains 
three basic elements:  
 
(a) Financial contribution; 
(b) By a government or public body within the territory of a member; 
(c) Which confers a benefit. 
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 Barcelo, John J, ‘Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping after the Tokyo Round', 
Cornell International Law Journal Vol.13(1980), p.261. 
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Resource Based Industries’, Report of proceedings on workshop on the impact of government 
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All of these must be satisfied in order for a subsidy to exist. The 
analysis of the forms of governmental action covered concentrates on two 
provisions which are particularly significant, the ‘financial contribution’ in the 
general definition of subsidy of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM and the form of 




2.2 The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
 
The SCM Agreement which constitutes the most general regulation of 
subsidies in the WTO has introduced for the first time a fairly sophisticated 
definition of subsidy in Article 1.
20
 In particular, under Article 1.1(a), the action 
by the government may be constituted by two alternative elements, a ‘financial 




Article 1.1(a) (1) of the SCM Agreement requires that for a subsidy to 
exit there must be a ‘financial contribution’ by a government or any public body. 
The provision also includes an elaborate list of various forms of financial 
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 Rubini, Luca, ‘The definition of subsidy and state aid: WTO and EC law in comparative 






 Legal Texts of Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
Available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm_01_e.htm  





(a) a government practices involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, 
loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or 
liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); 
(b) a government revenue that is otherwise due is forgone or not collected 
(e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits); 
(c) a government provides goods or services other than general 
infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
(d) a government makes payment to a funding mechanism, or entrust or 
directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions 
illustrated in (a) to (c) above which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practices, in no real sense, differs from practices 
normally followed by governments. 
 
For the purpose of the analysis, it is important to answer how this 
requirement should be interpreted and adapted. Also, it is critical to define the 
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 Legal Texts of Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
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2.2.1 Financial Contribution 
 
The SCM Agreement includes an exhaustive list of measures that are 
regarded as a ‘financial contribution’. The list identifies government practices 
that range from grants and loans to equity infusions, loan guarantees, fiscal 
incentives, the provision of goods or services and the purchase of goods.
24
 The 
SCM Agreement covers such measures even if they are carried out by a private 
entity, provided that a government has ‘entrusted’ or ‘directed’ the private entity 
to carry out one of the enumerated practices normally followed by 
governments.
25
 One of the most significant aspects of Article 1 is what is not 
included in that definition. ‘Any government practice that does not meet one the 




The Appellate body has underlined that the ‘financial contribution’ is 
separate from the ‘benefit’ and that these two elements together determine 
whether a subsidy exist.
27
 The report of the US-Export Restraints is considered 
as a landmark document for the definition of the subsidy, casting light on both 
                                            
24
 Steger, Debra P, ‘The WTO Doha Round Negotiations on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures: Issues for Negotiators’, Symposium on Economic Restructuring in Korea In Light of 




 Terry Collins-Williams, Gerry Salembier, ‘International Disciplines on Subsidies: The GATT, 
The WTO and the Future Agenda’, Journal of World Trade 30, no.1 (1996), p.10. 
27
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the interpretation and function of the requirement of financial contribution.
28
 
The main issue in Export Restraints was whether an ‘export restraints’ could 
constitute a financial contribution in the form of the government-entrusted or 
government-directed provision of goods in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(iii) and 
(iv) of the SCM.
29
 The central argument of the United States, the defendant, 
which mirrored its position on the notion of subsidy in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, was based on an exclusive emphasis on the effects produced by 
the governmental intervention in the economy.
30
 In response to the ‘effect 
approach’ advocated by the United States, the Panel underlined that the 
determination of whether a financial contribution exists must concentrate on the 
examination of the nature of the action by the government and not on its 
effects.
31
 It should finally noted that, according to the Panel, all forms of 
financial contribution involve a clear transfer of economic resources in the form 
of a transfer of something of value, either money, goods or services, from 
government or an intermediary to a private entity.
32
 Crucially, as a consequence 
of the function of limitation of the financial contribution, the converse is not 
necessarily true, that is, not all transfer of economic resources constitute a 
financial contribution under the SCM Agreement.
33
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2.2.2 Categories of Subsidies  
 
The SCM Agreement contains three specific categories of subsidies: 
prohibited, actionable and non-actionable. This is commonly referred to as the 
‘traffic light’ approach to classification of subsidies. This approach is based on 
the understanding that certain subsidies are not trade distorting at all or are even 
‘noble’.
34
 To be specific, the ‘red light’ category corresponds to prohibited 
subsidies, ‘yellow light’ to actionable subsidies and ‘green light’ to non-
actionable. However, the non-actionable category which covered R&D, 
regional development and environment in Part 4 of the Agreement lapsed on 31 
December 1999. 
The actionable subsidy category targets subsidies that cause ‘adverse 
effects’ to the interests of other Members. The Article 5 in Part 3 of the SCM 
Agreement lists three types of ‘adverse effects’ as follows: 35 
 
(a) injury to the industry of another Member; 
(b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to 
other Member under GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of 
concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994; 
                                            
34
 Negotiating Group on Rules, ‘WTO Negotiations Concerning the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Proposal by the European Communities’, TN/RL/W/30, 
21 Nov. 2002, 1 (hereinafter ‘EC Proposal’) 
35





(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member. 
 
The first type is injury caused to the domestic industry of another 
country by subsidized imports in its territory. In addition, the second type of 
‘adverse effects’ is nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under the 
GATT 1994 which happens most typically where the improved market access 
reasonably expected to be obtained from a bound tariff is nullified or impaired 
by subsidization of the product.
36
 The last type of ‘adverse effects’ can be 
explained ‘serious prejudice’. It usually arises as a result of adverse trade 
effects (for example, export displacement) in the home market of the 
subsidizing country or in a third country market.
37
 Serious prejudice in the 




(a) the total ad valorem subsidization of a product exceeding 5 per cent; 
(b) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an industry; 
(c) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an enterprises, other 
than one-time measures which are non-recurrent and cannot be 
repeated for that enterprises and which are given merely to provide 
                                            
36
 Overview of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
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time for the development of long-term solutions and to avoid acute 
social problems; 
(d) direct forgiveness of debt, i.e. forgiveness of government-held debt, 
and grants to cover debt repayment. 
 
Until 31 December 1999, the SCM Agreement contained a 
presumption of serious prejudice with respect to certain specified types of 
actionable subsidies.
39
 This presumption, like the non-actionable category in 
Part 3 of the Agreement, expired on that date.
40
 The SCM Agreement also 
exceptionally identifies two types of prohibited subsidies except as provided in 




(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of 
several other conditions, upon export performance, including those 
illustrated in Annex I; 
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other 
conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods. 
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 Overview of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
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As previously explained, subsidies contingent on export performance 
(export subsidies) and subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over 
imported goods (import substitution subsidies) are not allowed. These 
disciplines apply not only to developed countries but also to developing 
countries. However, developing countries benefited from special and 
differential treatment on the basis of Article 27 for a transitional period and 
least developed countries still benefit from it.
42
 The prohibition of paragraph 




(a) developing country Members referred to in Annex VII; 
(b) Other developing country Members for a period of eight years from the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, subject to compliance 
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 Steger, Debra P. ‘The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement: Ahead of its Time 
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2.3 The EU Anti-Subsidy Rules 
 
This part is aimed to introduce regulations and practices on subsidies 
and countervailing measures of the EU. In the context of the EU, subsidy is 
regulated by Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 on protection against 
dumped imports and Council Regulation (EC) No. 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 
which includes trade defense instruments against subsidized imports from non-
EU member countries.
44
 Its purpose is to cancel out any subsidy granted, 
directly or indirectly, for the manufacture, production, export or transport of any 
product originating in a non-EU country whose release on the EU market 
causes serious injury to competitors.
45
 
Proceedings are initiated upon a written complaint by any natural or 
legal person, or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of 
an EU industry.
46
 In the absence of any complaint, an EU country is in 
possession of sufficient evidence of subsidization and of resultant of injury to 
the EU industry; it can immediately communicate such evidence to the 
Commission.
47
 The complaint must include evidence of the existence of 
subsidies, injury and a causal link between these two elements. The complaint 
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is considered to have been made by or on behalf of the EU industry if: 
 
(a) it is supported by those EU producers whose collective output 
constitute more than 50% of the total EU production of the like 
product produced by that portion of the EU industry expressing either 
support for or opposition to the complaint; 
(b) also, investigation can be initiated where the portion of EU industry 
supporting the complaint accounts 25 % or more of total production of 
product concerned. 
 
The investigations on violation of subsidy rules may result in 
imposition of the countervailing measures to offset serious injuries from 
subsidization of other countries. The rate of duty for each case is fundamentally 
based on the amount of subsidy, unless lesser-duty rule is effective. In 
application of countervailing duties, the EU may choose to impose one or more 




(a) Ad-valorem duty – This is the most common form of duty, based on a 
percentage of the net, free-at-EU frontier (CIF) price. 
(b) Specific duty – This form of duty is based on a fixed value for a certain 
                                            
48
 Summaries of EU Legislation on Anti-subsidy measures, 
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amount of goods. 
(c) Variable duty – Based on a minimum import price (MIP), the EU do 
not impose countervailing duty if the foreign exporter’s export price to 
the EU is higher than MIP. 
 
Also, a company-specific price undertaking can be accepted upon 
request from exporter.
49
 This commitment is to respect minimum import prices 
and prevent them from falling below a certain price level.
50
 The price 
undertakings and its relevant rules are regulated by Article 13 of the basic anti- 
subsidy regulation.
51
 Once the European Commission accepts an undertaking, 
the company’s products are exempted from countervailing duties that would 
otherwise be charged when they are entered for free circulation and closely 
monitored by the Commission.
52
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THE WTO SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES DISPUTES 
 
3.1 The Time Pattern of Overall Dispute under the WTO 
 
Generally, a complaint arises under WTO dispute settlement when one 
member requests consultations with another member pursuant to the dispute 
settlement understanding (DSU).
53
 For each complaint, the WTO Secretariat 
assigns an individual dispute settlement (DS) number. As of 31 December 2015, 
there have been totally 501 WTO complaints filed under the DSU.
54
 Over the 
past 21years, the number of complaints filed each year has been as follows: 
 




1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015 
Complaints 185 139 78 86 13 
Average complaints per year 37 27.8 15.6 17.2 - 
Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on WTO Database 
 
In terms of the WTO members that have been involved in disputes, 
Tables 2 and 3 breaks down the number of complaints filed by and against some 
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of more active WTO members.
56
  
From the table 2 and 3, it is clear that the heaviest users of the WTO 
dispute settlement system have been the United States and the European Union 
(EU).
57
 In this regard, it is note that 204 complaints have involved either the 
United States or the EU as a complaining party (109 complaints and 95 
complaints respectively), which constitutes 38.6% of the total complaints.
58
 
Similarly, 206 complaints have involved in either the United States or the EU as 
the responding party (124, 82 complaints respectively), comprising 41.1% of 
the total complaints.
59
 The statistics also show that the number of complaints 
brought by the United States and the EU has been declined in recent years, and 
other WTO member such as China, one of representative emerging country, has 
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1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015 Total 
Brazil  6 16 2 3 0 27 
Canada  15 11 7 1 0 34 
Chile  2 7 1 0 0 10 
China  0 1 5 6 1 13 
European Union  47 21 13 14 0 95 
India  9 7 2 3 0 21 
Japan  8 4 1 6 2 21 
Korea  3 9 2 3 0 17 
Mexico  8 5 8 2 0 23 
United States 60 20 13 14 2 109 
Other - developed  12 6 4 4 2 28 
Other - developing  34 40 20 30 6 129 
Other - least developed  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 204 148 78 86 13 529 
* Note: A number of complaints have been filed by multiple Members acting jointly. In some 
of these complaints, the Members filing the complaint fall into different income categories. 
Where this is the case, we have counted the complaint once in each income category in which 
at least one complainant falls. Therefore, the number of the complaints in this table will add 
up to more than the total number of complaints under the DSU and also more than the number 
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1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015 Total 
Brazil  9 3 2 1 1 16 
Canada  10 3 2 3 0 18 
Chile  3 7 3 0 0 13 
China  0 1 16 15 2 34 
European Union  28 23 16 13 2 82 
India  13 4 3 2 1 23 
Japan  12 2 1 0 0 15 
Korea  11 2 1 0 1 15 
Mexico  3 9 2 0 0 14 
United States 39 49 20 14 1 123 
Other - developed  20 4 1 6 0 31 
Other - developing  37 32 11 30 5 115 
Other - least developed  0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4 suggests that the GATT has, by far, been invoked the most 
frequently in terms of the total number of complaints and this frequent 
invocation of the GATT can be explained many complaints refer to the 
provisions of other, more specific substantive agreements, as well as to the 
more general provision of the GATT.
62
 The trend of complaints over the year 
shows a generally high level of ‘trade remedy’ complaints brought pursuant to 
the anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures agreement and 
safeguards.
63
 With regard to some of the new areas of regulation such as 
services, intellectual property and SPS measures, the number of complaints has 




Table 4. Breakdown of Disputes by Agreement (1995-2015)65 
Agreement 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015 Total 
Anti-Dumping 21 38 21 26 5 111 
Agriculture 33 22 9 10 0 74 
Textiles and Clothing 11 5 0 0 0 16 
Customs 6 5 4 2 0 17 
GATS 10 5 4 3 0 22 
GATT 125 115 70 69 11 390 
Government Procurement 4 0 0 0 0 4 
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Licensing 25 8 1 10 0 44 
Rules of Origin 3 1 3 0 0 7 
Safeguards 9 22 5 10 2 48 
SCM 32 30 22 21 4 109 
SPS 16 14 6 6 1 43 
TBT 22 11 7 10 1 51 
TRIMS 15 4 6 14 1 40 





















Table 5 shows that total number of the SCM disputes fluctuated over 
the year. In overall, the number of SCM complaints under the WTO regime has 
been gradually decreased. If we look at the number of disputes in other five 
years since 1995, 32 cases were reported during the period of 1995 and 1999, 
30 cases between 2000 and 2004, 22 cases through 2005 and 2009 and recently, 
20 cases were filed under the WTO between 2010 and 2014 regarding the SCM 
issue.  
 
Table 5. Breakdown of SCM Disputes (1995-2015) 
95’ 96’ 97’ 98’ 99’ 00’ 01’ 02’ 03’ 04’ 05’ 06’ 07’ 08’ 09’ 10’ 11’ 12’ 13’ 14’ 15 
0 8 10 11 3 7 4 7 6 6 2 9 5 5 1 3 2 7 6 2 4 
 
  




























3.2 The Time Pattern of SCM Disputes under the WTO 
 
From the table 6 and 7, it is clear that the heaviest users of the SCM 
Agreements have been the United States and the EU. In this regard, 53 
complaints have involved either the United States or the EU as a complaining 
party which constitutes 48.6% of the total SCM disputes. Similarly, 51 
complaints have involved in either the United States or the EU as the 
responding party, comprising 46.8% of the total SCM complaints. This high 
involvement of those two major parties regarding to the SCM Agreement 
reveals that how do they sensitively react to the issue. The figure can be 
interpreted that, paradoxically, the United States and the EU is surmised to 
sustain subsidy programs in a direct or indirect way to support and protect their 
industries and firms from other competitors. 
 
Table 6. Complaining Countries of the WTO SCM Disputes (1995-2015) 
 
1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015 Total 
Australia 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Brazil 3 5 1 0 0 9 
Canada 2 8 2 0 0 12 
Chile 1 1 0 0 0 2 
China 0 0 2 3 0 5 
European Union 7 7 6 3 0 23 
India 0 2 2 1 0 5 





Japan 4 1 0 1 1 7 
Korea 0 5 1 1 0 7 
Mexico 0 2 2 1 0 5 
United States 15 3 5 6 1 30 
* Other developed, developing and least developed countries are not counted. 
Source: Author’s own calculation, based on WTO Database 
 
Table 7. Responding Countries of the WTO SCM Disputes (1995-2015) 
 
1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015 Total 
Australia 3 0 0 0 0 3 
Brazil 5 0 0 1 1 7 
Canada 5 1 2 2 0 10 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China 0 0 8 6 1 15 
European Union 2 7 2 5 1 17 
India 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Indonesia 4 0 0 0 0 4 
Japan 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Korea 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Mexico 0 2 1 0 0 3 
United States 4 18 6 5 1 34 
* Other developed, developing and least developed countries are not counted. 
Source: Author’s own calculation, based on WTO Database 
 
In recent years, however, China has actively involved in the SCM 
disputes since its accession to the WTO in 2001. As of 31 December 2015, 
totally 47 disputes were filed with China in the WTO as a complaint or 





classified as SCM disputes. More specifically, 5 cases were as complaints and 
the other 15 cases as respondents. It turned out to be the United States which 
targeted China the most under the Agreement of Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures with 9 cases out of total 15 SCM disputes against China. 
Table 8 below was organized with the data taken from the Semi Annual 
Reports of WTO members to the Committee on SCM matters. According to the 
reports, the United States, the EU and Canada are the top user of the relevant 
agreement for both initiations and impositions of the countervailing measures. 
The United States initiated 156 legal proceedings against other exporting 
countries and more than half, 86 of them, were imposed countervailing 
measures. In the same way, the EU initiated 74 investigations on the violation 
of subsidy rules against other trading partners and 35 cases of them were taken 
defensive measures. Further analysis on the method of countervailing measures 
of the EU will be discussed in Chapter IV in detail. 
 
Table 8. Top 5 Users of Countervailing Measures (1995-2014) 
Initiations                              Measures 
1) United States 156 1) United States 86 
2) European Union 74 2) European Union 35 
3) Canada 49 3) Canada 24 
4) Australia 18 4) Mexico 11 







Table 9 shows the number of SCM disputes by products. The most 
frequently disputed items were agricultural food and product, automobiles and 
parts and steel products. It shows totally 22 cases were filed under dispute 
settlement for the agricultural products and food, comprising 20.2% of SCM 
disputes. Similarly, 24 complaints have involved in automobile industry, which 
constitutes 22% of SCM disputes. In addition, 11 SCM cases were filed under 
disputes settlement procedure for the steel-related products. The statistics show 
that a number of SCM complaints brought to the WTO concentrated on those 
three categories, comprising 52.3% of the entire SCM disputes. In other words, 
those three sectors possibly indicated as critical industries politically as well as 
economically. 
 
Table 9. The Number of SCM Disputes by Product 
Product DS Number 
Agricultural Products (9) DS 265, 266, 267, 283, 295, 338, 357, 365, 489 
Agricultural and Food (13) 
DS 97, 103, 104, 145, 167, 265, 266, 283, 295, 310, 
314, 330, 341 
Aircraft (9) DS 46, 70, 71, 222, 316, 317, 347, 353, 487 
Apparel (1) DS 451 
Automobiles (16) 
DS 51, 52, 54, 55, 59, 64, 65, 81, 139, 142, 195, 339, 
340, 342, 440, 450 
Automobile Parts (1) DS 450 
Automotive (5) DS 51, 65, 81, 139, 142 
Automotive leather (2) DS 106, 126 
Beer (1) DS 354 
Biodiesels (1) DS 459 
Broiler Products (1) DS 427 
Building Materials Industries (1) DS 489 
Buses (1) DS 112 
Byrd Amendment (2) DS 217, 234 





Change of Ownership (2) DS 212, 280 
Cotton DS 267 
Customs Bond (1) DS 345 
Dairy Products (1) DS 103 
Distribution (2) DS 142, 476 
DRAMS (3) DS 296, 299, 336 
Energy (4) DS 412, 419, 426, 449 
Feed-In Tariff Program (2) DS 412, 426 
Flight Management System (2) DS 172, 173 
Foreign Sales Corporations (1) DS 108 
General (15) 
DS 108, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 194, 212, 217, 221, 
222, 234, 273, 379, 449 
Grants and Loans (3) DS 387, 388, 390 
Hardware Industries (1) DS 489 
Hot-rolled Steel (2) DS 138, 436 
Import Measures (2) DS 474, 494 
Large Residential Washers (1) DS 464 
Leather (1) DS 147 
Light Industry (1) DS 489 
Lumber (5) DS 194, 221, 236, 257, 277 
Machinery and Appliances (3) DS 46, 70, 296 
Medical Products (1) DS 489 
Methodologies (1) DS 494 
Non-Agricultural Goods (1) DS 449 
Olive Oil (2) DS 330. 341 
Other Products (7) DS 71, 147, 172, 173, 206, 213, 218 
PET (1) DS 486 
Paper (3) DS 368, 470, 491 
Peaches (1) DS 330 
Polyethylene and Polypropylene (1) DS 385 
Processed Cheese (1) DS 104 
Raw and Semi-finished (6) DS 138, 136, 257, 262, 277, 311 
Renewable Energy (2) DS 412, 452 
Salmon (1) DS 97 
Ship (3) DS 273, 301, 307 
Shrimps (1) DS 345 
Solar Energy (1) DS 456 
Solar Panels (1) DS 437 
Special Chemical Engineering (1) DS 489 
Spirits (1) DS 380 
Steel (9) DS 138, 206, 213, 218, 262, 280, 414, 436, 474 
Sugar (3) DS 265, 266, 283 
Tax (4) DS 358, 359, 472, 497 
Tax Treatment for Exports (5) DS 127,128, 129, 130, 131 





Textile (5) DS 57, 106, 126, 267, 489 
Trademarks (1) DS 59 
Vehicles (12) DS 51, 52, 54, 55, 59, 64, 65, 81, 112, 139, 142, 195 
Washer (1) DS 464 
Wheat Gluten (2) DS 145, 330 
Wind Power Equipment (2) DS 419, 437 
Wine (2) DS 354, 380 
 
* Some products are included in one or more categories. 




































3.3 The EU SCM Disputes by Targeted Country 
 
From the table 6 and 7, it is clear that the EU involved 23 cases as a 
complaining party and 17 cases as a respondent. The number of cases was 
totally 40 cases which constitute 36.7% of the total SCM disputes. Table 10 
distinguished the number of EU SCM disputes both as a complaints and 
respondent. The United States and Canada were the most frequently targeted 
countries for the SCM matters. In total, 12 cases out of 23 cases were filed 
under the dispute settlement which is equivalent to 52.2% of SCM disputes 
sued by the EU. Regionally, we can also recognize the EU targeted countries in 
North America (9 cases for the United States and 3 cases for Canada), Central 
and South America (2 cases for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico each) more than 
other regions. For those 5countries, 18 disputes out of 23 disputes, 78.3% of the 
total SCM disputes complained by the EU. Conversely, the United States, 
Korea and Russia were major players who filed the EU under the SCM 
agreement. Those three countries claimed that the EU for 10 cases, which 
account for 58.8% of total disputes against the EU. Especially, Korea is one of 
only two countries which filed the more petitions than EU did as a counterpart 
in the WTO. Korea-EU SCM disputes cases will be discussed in part 5.4 of 








Table 10. The EU SCM Disputes by Targeted Country (1995-2015) 
The EU as a complainant 
 































United States 9 
 




Source: Author’s own calculation, based on WTO Database 
 
3.4 The EU SCM Disputes by Product 
 
Figure 1 shows EU SCM Disputes as a complainant by industrial 
sector or product. Issues of the automobiles and parts, agricultural food and 
steel products were subject to SCM dispute settlements the most under the 
WTO. Regarding the issues, 4 cases filed each and this comprising 52.2% of 
total SCM disputes which were complained by the EU. Also, disputes in the 
category of aircraft products followed previous subject matters. For the 
products, 3 cases and account for 13%. From the figure, it is clear that the EU is 





Figure 1. The EU SCM Disputes as a Complainant by Industrial Sector/Product 
 
* DS 212 and DS 354 are included in more than one category. 
Source: Author’s own calculation, based on WTO Database 
 
Figure 2 shows EU SCM disputes as a respondent by industry or 
product. Issues of the agricultural food and product were subject to SCM 
dispute settlements the most. For the EU, 4 cases were petitioned by other 
countries for the relevant products, comprising 23.5% of SCM disputes. Also, 
disputes on the product of aircrafts, chemicals, energies and solar/renewable 
energies, Polyethylene and Polypropylene and ships include 2 cases each and 
comprising 58.8% in total. As a result, it is confirmed that the EU is involved in 
the disputes over SCM Agreement as both a complainant and a respondent in 
the certain category of industry or product.  
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Figure 2. The EU SCM Disputes as a Respondent by Industrial Sector/Product 
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3.5 The EU Agricultural Subsidy Policy 
 
The European Union is one of the largest users of subsidies both in 
terms of value and volume. Especially, the EU sustained its dominant position 
as a user of subsidies in the agricultural industry since long ago. However, the 
size of EU agricultural subsidies has been changed as the world price and 
exchange rate fluctuated. Thus, this chapter will give an overview of EU 
Subsidy programs associated with what types of subsidies are exist for the 
purpose of supporting the agricultural sector in the European countries. 
The forms of subsidy vary by country and commodity as well. The 
main forms of subsidy include: (a) direct payments to farmers and landlord; (b) 
price supports implemented with government purchases and storage; (c) 
regulations that set minimum prices by location, end use, or some other 
characteristic; (d) subsidies for such items as crops insurance, disaster response, 
credit, marketing and irrigation water; (e) export subsidies; and (f) import 
barriers in the form of quotas, tariffs or regulations.
66
 
The EU occasionally grants a direct support in proportion to land 
ownership, and utilizes a set of requirement referred to as cross-compliance.
67
 
Cross compliance is explained as a mechanism that links direct payments to 
compliance by farmers with basic standards concerning the environment, food 
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safety, animal and plant health and animal welfare, as well as the requirement of 
maintaining land in good agricultural and environmental condition.
68
 Cross 
compliance became mandatory for all EU farmers receiving direct payment in 
2005.
69
 In addition, guaranteed prices (also called marketing loans or loan 
benefits) are tied to current production of specific crops and are “inversely 
proportional to current market prices.”
70
 Economists argue that the production 
of the crops in question would decline.
71
 For this reason, the EU guaranteed 
minimum prices are given for certain main commodities.
72
 Countercyclical 
payments, which considered as a safety net in the EU, are payments inversely 
related to the market prices for certain goods, however, they are not tied to the 
production of any single crop.
73
 
The two categories of agricultural subsidies most troubling to the WTO 
include export subsidies and import tariffs.
74
 Currently, the EU is in the midst 
of efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate export subsidies, claiming that its 
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THE IMPOSITION OF COUNTERVAILING MEASURES BY THE EU 
 
4.1  The Trend of Countervailing Initiations 
 
The European Union initiates investigations on its own anti-subsidy 
regulations. Table 11 below presents countervailing initiations of both the EU 
and the worldwide. As of 31 December 2014, totally 74 cases were targeted 
against 22 countries for countervailing initiations by the EU. Those countries 
could easily grouped by high income countries, middle and low income 
countries, Middle East countries and others. The middle and low income 
countries, which include 7 Asian countries and the most targeted group, were 
directed 45 cases and 60.8% of total EU initiation. In the group, India was 
targeted the most followed by China and those two countries occupied 29 cases, 
39.2% of EU initiations. China, the most frequently investigated country 
regarding the SCM issues, targeted mainly by the United States. It turned out to 
be 46 initiations out of 90, which account for more than half of total initiations 
against China, were tackled by the United States. In the case of high income 
countries, 19 cases and 25.7% of the EU initiations were directed. Even in this 
group, Asian countries such as Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei were 
main target in terms of the number of EU countervailing initiations, followed by 
the United States and other countries. In addition, for the countries in the 





countervailing measures by the EU. Overall, it is quite obvious that cases are 
heavily concentrated on Asian countries. Regardless of group of the nations, 59 
cases were reported against Asian countries which constitute approximately 80% 
of the initiations in total. The EU, also, shows the higher percentage of 































Cases  Share in Total  Rank 
Worldwide 
 
Cases  Share in Total  Rank 
High Income Countries 
Australia 1 1% 10 1 0.2% 29 
Korea, Republic of 7 9% 3 24 6% 3 
Norway 1 1% 10 1 0.2% 29 
Singapore 1 1% 10 1 0.2% 29 
Taipei, Chinese 6 8% 4 9 2% 9 
United States 3 4% 8 15 4% 5 
Group Total 19 26% - 51 13% - 
Middle and Low Income Countries(Asia) 
China 9 12% 2 90 24% 1 
India 20 27% 1 65 17% 2 
Indonesia 5 7% 5 19 5% 4 
Malaysia 4 5% 7 8 2% 12 
Philippines 1 1% 10 2 0.5% 22 
Thailand 5 7% 5 14 4% 6 
Viet Nam 1 1% 10 7 2% 14 
Group Total 45 61% - 205 54% - 
Middle East 
Iran, Islamic Republic of 1 1% 10 1 0.2% 29 
Oman 1 1% 10 5 1% 17 
Pakistan 1 1% 10 4 1% 18 
Saudi Arabia 2 3% 9 2 0.5% 22 
Turkey 1 1% 10 9 2% 9 
United Arab Emirates 1 1% 10 3 0.8% 19 
Group Total 7 9% - 24 6% - 
Other 
Argentina 1 1% 10 9 2% 9 
Peru 1 1% 10 1 0.2% 29 
South Africa 1 1% 10 7 2% 14 
Group Total 3 4% - 17 4% - 





Table 12 suggests countervailing measures imposed by the EU and that 
of the worldwide. As of 31 December 2014, totally 35 cases and 202 cases were 
reported respectively. The former 35 cases were targeted against 14 countries 
for the imposition of countervailing measures by the EU. The middle and low 
income countries, which include 6 Asian countries and the most targeted group, 
were directed 24 cases which account for approximately 70% of total EU 
countervailing measures. In the group, India was imposed the most followed by 
China and those two countries occupied 18 cases, 51% of EU countervailing 
measures. In the worldwide, China is the country which was imposed 
countervailing measures the most regarding the relevant issue. The impositions 
of measures for China, whereas, were mainly taken by the United States. It 
turned out to be 29 countervailing measures out of 56, approximately 52% of 
impositions for China, were decided by the United States. For the high income 
countries, 8 cases and 23% of the EU measures were reported. Even in this 
group, Asian countries such as Chinese Taipei and Republic of Korea were 
main targets, followed by Australia, Norway and the United States with 1 case 
for each. In addition, for the Middle East countries, 3 impositions were reported 
and this is 9% of total countervailing measures of the EU. Consequently, we can 
conclude that countervailing measures are also concentrated on Asian countries 
as we already witnessed the same result for the case of initiations. Regardless of 
group of the nations, 29 cases were reported against Asian countries which 
constitute 83% of the EU countervailing measures in total. The EU, also, 





worldwide in terms of the share in total. 
 





Cases  Share in Total  Rank 
Worldwide 
 
Cases  Share in Total  Rank 
High Income Countries 
Australia 1 3% 7 1 0.5% 22 
Korea, Republic of 2 6% 4 9 4% 4 
Norway 1 3% 7 1 0.5% 22 
Taipei, Chinese 3 9% 3 4 2% 10 
United States 1 3% 7 8 4% 6 
Group Total 8 23% - 23 11% - 
Middle and Low Income Countries(Asia) 
China 5 14% 2 56 28% 1 
India 13 37% 1 36 18% 2 
Indonesia 2 6% 4 8 4% 6 
Malaysia 2 6% 4 3 1.5% 13 
Philippines 1 3% 7 2 1% 18 
Thailand 1 3% 7 3 1.5% 13 
Group Total 24 69% - 108 53% - 
Middle East 
Iran, Islamic Republic of 1 3% 7 1 0.5% 22 
Pakistan 1 3% 7 2 1% 18 
United Arab Emirates 1 3% 7 1 0.5% 22 
Group Total 3 9% - 4 2% - 








4.2 The Imposition of Countervailing Measures by Product 
 
The EU finally concluded 6 measures on 19 initiations for high income 
countries. Each of these cases imposed countervailing duty for the different 
types of products. The United States imposed specific duty for the product of 
Biodiesel and Australia, 6% of ad-valorem duty for polyester staple fibers. 
Norway, the only retaliated European country, charged measure for salmon. For 
the Asian countries, Taiwan imposed duties twice for the products of both hot-
rolled coils and SBS thermoplastic rubbers. In particular, the only product 
which imposed countervailing measures on Korea was DRAMs. However, the 
case is currently on the status of revocation.    
 
Table 13. Countervailing Measures for High Income Countries by Product 
(1995-2014) 
High Income Countries 




Biodiesel 3824 2 
X Singapore 
O United States 
Bioethanol 2207 1 X United States 
DRAMs 8542 1 O Korea(Rep. of) 
Hot-rolled coils  
(flat rolled products of iron or non-
alloy steel) 
7208 1 O Taiwan 
Polyester staple fibers 5503 3 
O Australia 






Polyester textured filament yarn 
(PTY) 
5402 1 X Korea(Rep. of) 
Polyethylene terephthalate  
(PET) 
3907 2 
X Korea(Rep. of) 
X Taiwan 
Salmon  0302 1 O Norway 
SBS thermoplastic rubbers 4002 1 O Taiwan 
Sodium metal 2805 1 X United States 
Stainless steel fasteners and parts 
thereof 
7318 1 X Singapore 
Stainless steel wire (< 1 mm) 7223 1 X Korea(Rep. of) 
Stainless steel wire (= or > 1 mm) 7223 1 X Korea(Rep. of) 





Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on European Commission Database 
 
The middle and low income countries, including representative 
emerging countries such as China and India, imposed countervailing duties 
dominantly compare to other groups. In the group, duties either ad-valorem or 
specific, were imposed 24 measures on 47 initiations. In fact, 11 impositions of 
duties, comprising 45.8 % of total measures of middle and low income 
countries involved in categories of steel and textile products. Most of them, 8 
measures particularly, were against India. The other 3 measures were targeted 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines respectively. Even those 3 countries were 
imposed duties for the products related to the steel and textile. Overall, we can 
conclude that the EU presents a greater share of measures on China and India. 
The EU, also, reacted more sensitively toward steel and textile industry or 






Table 14. Countervailing Measures for Middle and Low Income Countries 
by Product (1995-2014) 
Middle and Low Income Countries 
Product HS Code 
Cases Targeted 
Country Initiation Measure 
Antibiotics (broad spectrum)  2941 1 O India 
Artificial graphite 8545 1 X India 
Bed linen 6302 1 O India 
Bicycles  8712 1 X China 
Biodiesel 3824 1 X Indonesia 
Coated fine paper 4810 1 O China 
Compact disks - recordable  
(CD-Rs) 
8523 1 O India 
Dihydromyrcenol 2905 1 X India 
Filament glass fiber products 7019 1 O China 
Graphite electrode systems 8545 1 O India 
Hot-rolled coils  
(flat rolled products of iron or non-alloy 
steel) 
7208 1 O India 
Magnetic disks (3,5'' micro disks) 8523 1 X India 
Organic coated steel products 7210 1 O China 
Plastic sacks and bags 3923 2 
X Malaysia 
X Thailand 






Polyester textured filament yarn 
(PTY) 
5402 3 
O (1/2) India 
X Indonesia 











Polyethylene terephthalate film 
(PET film) 
3920 1 O India 
Purified terephthalic acid and its salts 2917 1 X Thailand 
Ring binder mechanisms 8305 2 
X India 
O Indonesia 
Solar glass 7007 1 X China 
Solar panels  
(crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules 
and key components) 
3818/8501 1 O China 
Stainless steel bars 7222 1 O India 
Stainless steel bright bars 7222 1 O India 
Stainless steel cold-rolled flat products 
 
1 X China 
Stainless steel fasteners and parts thereof 7318 6 
O (1/2) India 
O (1/2) Malaysia 
O Philippines 
X Thailand 
Stainless steel wire 7223 1 X India 
Stainless steel wire (< 1 mm) 7223 1 O India 
Stainless steel wire (= or > 1 mm) 7223 1 O India 
Sulphanilic acid 2921 1 O India 





Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on European Commission Database 
 
The EU determined 3 impositions of duty for Middle East countries 
out of 7 initiations in total. Iran, Pakistan and UAE were imposed specific duty 
on Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) product respectively. Also, the EU 
embarked on investigations against other two countries for different categories 
of products. It was Argentina for Biodiesel and South Africa for hot-rolled coils. 






Table 15. Countervailing Measures for Middle East Countries by Product 
(1995-2014) 
Middle East 




Binder or baler twine 
(polypropylene) 
5607 1 X Saudi Arabia 













Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on European Commission Database 
 
Table 16. Countervailing Measures for Other Countries by Product 
 (1995-2014) 
Other 




Biodiesel 3824 1 X Argentina 
Hot-rolled coils  
(flat rolled products of iron or non-
alloy steel) 












4.3 The Countervailing Measures by Type 
 
Table 17 below presents disaggregation of anti-subsidy measures by 
type of countervailing duty. For countervailing measure, there are options 
whether they are ad-valorem or specific as previously discussed in chapter II. 
The vast majority of measures for the subsidy in the EU are in the form of duty 
with preference for ad-valorem duties to specific ones.
76
 The EU, as a result of 
initiation, imposed countervailing measure on 33 investigations for 24 types of 
products. Special duty was imposed on only two products, Biodiesel and 
Polyethylene terephthalate (PET), which cover 7 countervailing measures out of 
total. For other 22 categories of products, containing 26 measures, ad-valorem 
duty was imposed. In short, the EU predominantly determined ad-valorem duty 
rather than other measures which account for 78.8% of total decision. 
 
Table 17. Countervailing Measures by Type (1995-2014) 
Country Product 
Measures in Force 
Status 
Type (%, EUR/ton net) 
High Income Countries 
Australia Polyester staple fibers Ad-valorem 6% Exp. 
Korea (Rep. of) DRAMs Ad-valorem 0~34.8% Rep. 
Norway Salmon Ad-valorem 3.8% Term. 
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(flat rolled products of iron or 
non-alloy steel) 
Ad-valorem 0~4.4% Exp. 
SBS thermoplastic rubbers Ad-valorem 1.0~8.2% Exp. 




Middle and Low Income Countries 
China 
Coated fine paper Ad-valorem 4~12% Def. 
Filament glass fiber products Ad-valorem 4.9~10.3% Def. 
Organic coated steel products Ad-valorem 13.7~44.7% Def. 
Solar panels 
(crystalline silicon 






Antibiotics (broad spectrum) Ad-valorem 11.9~32% Rep. 
Bed linen Ad-valorem 5.2~9.7% Exp. 
Compact disks - recordable  
(CD-Rs) 
Ad-valorem 7.30% Rep. 
Graphite electrode systems Ad-valorem 6.3~7.2% Def. 
Hot-rolled coils 
(flat rolled products of iron or 
non-alloy steel) 
Ad-valorem 4.9~13.1% Exp. 
Polyester textured filament 
yarn (PTY) 








film (PET film) 
Ad-valorem 5.4~19.1% Exp. 
Stainless steel bars Ad-valorem 3.4~4.3% Def. 
Stainless steel bright bars Ad-valorem 0~25.5% Exp. 
Stainless steel fasteners and  
parts thereof 
Ad-valorem 3.2~16.5% Term. 
Stainless steel wire (< 1mm) Ad-valorem 0~44.4% Exp. 
Stainless steel wire  
(= or > 1mm) 
Ad-valorem 0~48.8% Exp. 
Sulphanilic acid Ad-valorem 4.70% Rep. 
Indonesia 
Polyester staple fibers Ad-valorem 0~10% Exp. 
Ring binder mechanisms Ad-valorem 10% Exp. 





(PET) EUR/ton net 
Stainless steel fasteners and 
parts thereof 
Ad-valorem 0~1.8% Exp. 
Philippines 
Stainless steel fasteners and 
parts thereof 






























* Exp. (Expired); Rep. (Repealed); Term. (Terminated); Def. (Definitive measures); Def/IR. 
(Interim review); Ci. (Anti-circumvention investigation)  


















4.4 The Comparison of the Measures between the EU and the US 
 
A comparison of anti-subsidy enforcement both in the EU and the US, 
two traditional major players in terms of subsidy related trade dispute, would 
emphasize any recent trends in self countervailing initiations of the EU. The 
data on initiations of subsidy issue between 2005 and 2014 collected from WTO 
statistics on SCM, relevant documents from the European Commission and the 
United States Department of Commerce. The table 18 displays the number of 
disputes filed under the WTO as well as the number of investigation initiations 
with targeted products and countries under own anti-subsidy regulations. The 
EU, as confirmed in the previous chapter, mostly targeted Asian countries even 
during the last decade. Totally 23 initiations out of 33, comprising 
approximately 70%, were directed to the Asian countries, including China, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. China and India, 
particularly, investigated for the categories of product such as steel, solar panels 
and glass and polyester staple fibers. The EU imposed 12 measures regarding 
33 initiations in total. The United States initiated an inquiry concerning the 
subsidy issue against China during the last decade. For China, the United States 
investigated for 48 cases out of total 88 initiations and specificity of targeted 
products was not found. The United States, unlike the EU, initiated 7 legal 
proceedings for the subsidy issue against Korea. The products involved were 
coated free sheet paper, Ni-Resist piston inserts, bottom mount combination 





steel nails and welded line pipe. 
 
Table 18. The Initiation of Subsidy Investigation in the EU and the US 
(2005-2014) 
 







United States Department of 
Commerce 
Initiations Meas. Initiations Meas. 
   
Product 
   
Product 
 
05 2 2 
- Plastic sacks and bags 
(Malaysia, Thailand) 




06 3 1 
- Dihydromyrcenol 
(India) 
0 3 3 
- Coated Free Sheet  
Paper  
(China, Indonesia,  
Korea) 
2 
07 0 1 
- Artificial graphite 
(India) 
0 1 11 
- Circular Welded Pipe 
(China)  
- Circular Welded  
Carbon Quality Steel  
Pipe (China) 
- Laminated Woven  
Sacks (China) 
- Light-Walled  
Rectangular Pipe 
(China) 
- Light-weight Thermal  
Paper(China)  
- LWR Pipe and Tube 
(China)  
- OTR Tires(China)  
- Pneumatic Off-The- 
Road Tires (China)  
- Raw Flexible Magnets  
(China)  
- Sodium Nitrite (China) 
- Stainless Plate in Coils  






08 1 2 
- Biodiesel (USA)  
 
- Sodium metal (USA) 
0 1 8 
- Certain Tow-Behind  
Lawn Groomers 
(China) 
- Circular Welded  
Austenitic Stainless  
Pressure Pipe (China)  
- Circular Welded  
\ Carbon Quality Steel  
Line Pipe (China) 
- Citric Acid (China)  
- Kitchen Appliance  
Shelving and Racks  
(China)  
- Lawn Groomers 
(China)  
- Line Pipe (China) 
- Matchbooks (India) 
7 
09 0 6 
- Purified terephthalic 
acid and its salts 
(Thailand)  
 
- Stainless steel 






(Iran, Pakistan, UAE) 
1 0 13 
- Certain Magnesia  
Carbon Bricks (China)  
- Certain Oil Country  
Tubular goods (China)  
- Certain Seamless steel  
pipe (China)  
- Certain Steel Gratings  
(China)  
- Coated Paper for  
High-Quality Print 
(China)  
- Narrow Woven  
Ribbons with Woven  
Selvedge (China)  
- Potassium Phosphate  
Salts (China)  
- Pre-Stressed Concrete  
Steel Wire Strand 
(China)  
- Wire Decking (China)  
- Ni-Resist Piston 
(Argentina)  
- Coated Paper 
(Indonesia)  
- Ni-Resist Piston  
Inserts(Korea)  
- Polyethylene Retail  
Carrier Bags(Vietnam) 
6 
10 0 4 
- Biodiesel (Singapore)  
 
- Coated fine paper 
(China)  
 
- Stainless steel bars 
(India)  
3 2 2 
- Drill Pipe (China) 
- Multilayered Wood   







- Wireless wide area 
networking modems 
(China) 
11 1 4 




(Oman, Saudi Arabia) 
 
- Stainless steel 
fasteners and parts 
thereof (India) 
2 1 9 
- Certain Steel Wheel 
(China)    
- Crystalline Silicon  
Photovoltaic Cells 
(China)    
- Galvanized Steel Wire   
(China)    
- High Pressure Steel  
Cylinders (China)    
- Circular Welded     
Carbon-Quality Steel 
Pipe (India, Oman, 
UAE, Vietnam) 





12 0 6 
- Bicycle (China)  
 
- Biodiesel 
(Indonesia, Argentina)  
 
- Organic coated steel 
products (China)  
 
- Solar panels (China)  
 
- Stainless steel wire 
(India) 
0 2 4 
- Drawn Stainless Steel  
Sinks (China)  
- Utility Scale Wind  
Towers (China)   
- Large Residential  
Washers (Korea)  
- Steel Wire Garment  
Hangers (Vietnam)  
2 
13 1 5 
- Filament glass fiber 
products (China)  
 





- Solar glass (China) 
3 1 19 
- China TFE (China)  
- Chlorinated   
Isocyanurates (China)  
- Grain-Oriented    
Electronic Steel 
(China)  
- MSG  
(China, Indonesia)  




- Frozen Warm-water  
Shrimp (China, 
Ecuador, India,   
Indonesia, Malaysia,  






- Oil Country Tubular  
Goods (India) 
- Threaded Rod (India)  
- Oil Country Tubular  
Goods (Turkey)  
- Steel Concrete  
Reinforcing Bar 
(Turkey) 
14 1 2 
- Stainless steel cold- 




2 0 17 
- Boltless Steel Shelving  
(China)   
- Calcium Hypochlorite  
(China)   
- Crystalline Silicon  
Photovoltaic Products 
(China)   
- Dry Containers    
(China)   
- Melamine 
(China, Trinidad and  
Tobago)  
- Passenger Tires 
(China)   
- Steel Wire Rod 
(China)   
- Steel Nails 
(Malaysia, Oman, 
Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, 
Vietnam) 
- Sugar (Mexico) 
- Welded Line Pipe 
(Korea, Turkey)  
7 
       
 
 
Total 9 33 
 
12 11 88  41 
Source: Author’s own elaboration, based on WTO, European Commission Database and 











ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN KOREA AND THE EU 
 
5.1 Recent Trends in Trade between Korea and the EU 
 
In 2010, Korea and the EU finally agreed to sign up for Korea-EU Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) which has been negotiated since 2007. The Korea-EU 
FTA was the first bilateral trade agreement completed with an Asian country for 
the EU. This new generation of agreement goes further than previous agreement 
in lifting trade barriers.
77
 Thus, the Korea-EU FTA is evaluated as a symbolic 
event showing proliferation of free trade and economic partnership between two 
parties. 
The EU continues its close cooperative relationship with Korea, one of 
country emerged as a power house of global economy. Korea was reported the 
11th largest economy in the world with a GDP per capita reaching 21,152.2 
Euros in 2014. According to the European Commission, Korea is the EU’s the 
eighth largest trade partner, while the EU is Korea’s third largest export 
destination (following China and the US). As of October 2015, the EU is the 
third biggest trading partner of Korea based on total trade value. It can be 
interpreted that trade between both parties has high level of dependency and the 
economy of Korea and the EU is significantly intertwined. 
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Table 19. Top Trading Partners of Korea in 2014 
(Unit: Mil €, %) 
Imports Export Total Trade 
Partner Value World Partner Value World Partner Value World 
          
 
World 383,475 100 World 417, 871 100 World 801,346 100 
1 China 65,734 17.1 China 106,018 25.4 China 171,753 21.4 
2 EU 28 45,532 11.9 USA 51,486 12.3 USA 84,717 10.6 
3 Japan 39,235 10.2 EU 28 38,109 9.1 EU 28 83,640 10.4 
4 USA 33,231 8.7 Japan 23,485 5.6 Japan 62,720 7.8 
5 Saudi Arabia 26,777 7 Hong Kong 19,889 4.8 Saudi Arabia 32,824 4.1 
6 Qatar 18,770 4.9 Singapore 17,331 4.1 Singapore 25,579 3.2 
7 Australia 14,896 3.9 Vietnam 16,310 3.9 Taiwan 22,451 2.8 
8 Kuwait 12,326 3.2 Taiwan 11,002 2.6 Australia 22,399 2.8 
9 UAE 11,817 3.1 India 9,328 2.2 Vietnam 22,141 2.8 
10 Taiwan 11,449 3 Indonesia 8,290 2 Hong Kong 21,166 2.6 
Source: European Commission 
 
 Table 20. Top Trading Partners of the EU in 2014 
(Unit: Mil €, %) 
Imports Export Total Trade 
Partner Value World Partner Value World Partner Value World 
          
 
World 1,685,003 100 World 1,703,076 100 World 3,388,079 100 
1 China 302,049 17.9 USA 311,035 18.3 USA 517,162 15.3 
2 USA 206,127 12.2 China 164,777 9.7 China 466,826 13.8 





4 Swiss 96,633 5.7 Russia 103,315 6.1 Swiss 236,998 7.0 
5 Norway 86,792 5.2 Turkey 74,639 4.4 Norway 136,993 4.0 
6 Japan 55,211 3.3 Japan 53,272 3.1 Turkey 129,013 3.8 
7 Turkey 54,374 3.2 Norway 50,201 2.9 Japan 108,483 3.2 
8 Korea 38,796 2.3 Korea 43,196 2.5 Korea 81,992 2.4 
9 India 37,120 2.2 UAE 42,756 2.5 India 72,587 2.1 
Source: European Commission 
 
After slowing down in 2009 due to the financial crisis, trade flows 
between the EU and Korea started to increase again in 2010.
78
 In 2011, Korea 
reached the important benchmark of $ 1 trillion total foreign trade (close to 100% 
of the Korean GDP).
79
 EU exports to Korea enjoyed an annual average growth 
rate of 7% between 2007 and 2011.
80
 In addition, one of the significant 
phenomenons triggered between both parties would be the transition to a trade 
surplus of the EU, which has long been suffered from chronic balance of 
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Table 21. The EU Trade Flows and Balances with Korea 
(Unit: Mil €, %) 
Period Imports Exports Balance Total Trade 
 
Value Growth Extra-EU Value Growth Extra-EU Value Value 
         
2005 34,589 12.3 2.9 20,239 12.9 1.9 -14,349 54,828 
2006 40,949 18.4 3 22,815 12.7 2 -18,133 63,764 
2007 41,676 1.8 2.9 24,719 8.4 2 -16,957 66,395 
2008 39,740 -4.6 2.5 25,495 3.1 1.9 -14,245 65,235 
2009 32,472 -18.3 2.6 21,599 -15.3 2 -10,873 54,071 
2010 39,534 21.8 2.6 27,961 29.5 2.1 -11,573 67,496 
2011 36,312 -8.2 2.1 32,515 16.3 2.1 -3,798 68,827 
2012 38,019 4.7 2.1 37,812 16.3 2.2 -206 75,831 
2013 35,837 -5.7 2.1 39,910 5.6 2.3 4,073 75,748 
2014 38,796 8.3 2.3 43,196 8.2 2.5 4,400 81,992 
* Growth: Relative variation between current and previous period. 
* Extra-EU: Imports/Exports as percent of all EU partners i.e. excluding trade between EU 
Member States 
Source: European Commission 
 
Figure 3. The EU Trade Flows and Balances with Korea (2004 - 2014) 
 





The trade between the EU and Korea is dominated by power/non-
electrical machinery, chemicals, transport equipment, optical and photo 
equipment and base metals.
81
 The EU records a significant surplus in trade in 
services with Korea. The EU provides to Korea specialized services in sectors 
such as banking, financial and accounting services.
82
 In certain sectors, in 
particular telecommunications, financial services, environmental services and 
professional services, the EU is expecting more benefit from the Korea-EU 
FTA due to legislative changes in Korea. However, many of the pre-FTA 
restrictions will only be lifted after the expiry of transitional periods, necessary 
for Korea to revise its regulatory framework. Therefore, depending on the 




Figure 4. The EU Trade Balance in Services with Korea 
 
Source: European Commission 
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 Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement,  
Available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150647.pdf, 





5.2 Overview of Korea-EU FTA 
 
The Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement entered into force in July 2011. 
The implementation phase of FTA is now ongoing to ensure that the mechanism 
used are efficient and effective in providing market access for both EU 
businesses in Korea and businesses of Korea in the EU. Following the entry 
into force of the FTA in July 2011, EU exports to Korea of products fully 
liberalized as from the entry into force of the agreement have increased more 
than other products. Exports of these products, representing 35% of EU exports 
to Korea, increased by 54% (€4.4 billion) between July 2011 and June 2012, 
compared to the referenced period.
84
 By comparison, exports of the same fully 
liberalized products to the world have increased by 27%.
85
 For products 
partially liberalized, representing 43% of EU’s exports to Korea, the increase in 
export was 35% or €3.9 billion.
86
 
The agreement eliminate tariff for industrial and agricultural goods in a 
progressive, step by step approach. Only a limited number of agricultural 
products are excluded from tariff elimination. In addition to eliminating duties 
on nearly all trade in goods, the agreement addresses non-tariff barriers to trade. 
It also includes provisions on issues ranging from services and investments, 
competition rules, government procurement, intellectual property rights 
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(including geographical indications), transparency of regulation and sustainable 
development. 
The Korea-EU FTA is the most comprehensive free trade agreement 
ever negotiated by the EU. Import duties are eliminated on nearly all products 
and there is far reaching liberalization of trade in services covering all modes of 
supply. Specific commitments to eliminate and to prevent non-tariff obstacles 
to trade have been agreed on sectors such as automobiles, pharmaceuticals or 
electronics. Especially, EU car imports from Korea have increased by 20% (€ 
663 million) in value and 12% in volume during the first year of the FTA 
compared to the reference period.
87
 Despite the increase in car imports from 
Korea since the provisional application of the FTA, the level of car imports 
remains 37% below the level for the same twelve month period four years 
earlier.
88
 According to Eurostat, on the other hand, EU car exports to Korea 
have increased by 69% (€840 million) in value and 70% in volume during the 
first twelve months of the FTA compared to the reference period. Cars have 
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Figure 5. The EU Imports in Automobile Sector from Korea 






















Cars 84,631 77,715 60,931 54,363 68,637 86,668 97,135 91,733 101,793 90,347 
Car parts 38, 608 37,783 42,734 53,486 49,392 48,049 67,611 60,900 68,888 87,351 













5.3 Regulations on Subsidies in the Korea-EU FTA 
 
The Korea-EU FTA differs from many other FTAs, in that it deals with 
subsidies within the chapter on competition. This approach mirrors the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU, which clearly classified ‘state aid’ as a part of 
competition law.
90
 Thus, the competition chapter in the Korea-EU FTA seems 
to reflect the existing example of the TFEU, even though the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act in Korea do not address subsidies. Some scholars 
have analyzed that the EU’s inclusion of subsidy in the competition chapter of 
its FTAs and the different stance on subsidy between the EU and WTO come 
not only from the objectives of subsidy control within WTO and EU, but also 
from the objectives of both organizations. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand the EU’s stance on subsidies, since Korea has traditionally defined 
subsidies, as a question of trade remedies.
91
 
  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea explains that the 
definition of the subsidy, and related contents mentioned in the competition 
chapter of the FTA, are identical to those of WTO Agreement on Subsidies, and, 
therefore, Korea will not take on any additional obligations.
92
 Yet, others have 
suggested that the Korea-EU FTA stipulates the issue of Subsidies more 
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systematically and in a more detailed way.
93
 This is an important discussion, 
particularly as subsidies have been an issue that has spurred several trade 
disputes between Korea and the EU.
94
 
In Korea-EU FTA articles, Section B of Chapter 11 of the Korea-EU 
FTA deals with subsidies. The basic principle in Section B of Chapter 11 of the 
Korea-EU FTA is as follows: 
 
The Parties agree to use their best endeavors to remedy or remove 
through the application of their competition laws or otherwise, 
distortions of competition caused by subsidies in so far as they affect 




According to provisions in the Section B, both parties’ right to take 
remedy actions under the WTO agreements is still guaranteed in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreements without any prejudice. In 
other words, regarding subsidies and countervailing measures, the Korea-EU 
FTA maintains the rights and responsibilities with to dispute settlement, trade 
remedy action or other appropriate measures against a subsidy granted by the 
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The Korea-EU FTA uses WTO SCM Agreement as a reference to 
define a subsidy and specificity. The Article 11.10 defines a subsidy as a 
measure which fulfils the conditions set out in Article 1.1 of the SCM 
Agreement. It also indicates that subsidy is specific if it falls within the 
meaning of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement and a subsidy shall be subject to 




The subsidies provisions of the Korea-EU FTA also potentially go 
beyond the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures. Article 11.11 of the FTA specifies two following types of subsidy 
shall be prohibited: 
 
(a) subsidies granted under any legal arrangement whereby a government 
or any public body is responsible for covering debts or liabilities of 
certain enterprises within the meaning of Article 2.1 of the SCM 
Agreement without any limitation, in law or in fact, as to the amount of 
those debts and liabilities or the duration of such responsibility; and 
 
(b) subsidies (such as loans and guarantees, cash grants, capital injections, 
provision of assets below market prices or tax exemptions) to insolvent 
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or ailing enterprises, without a credible restructuring plan based on 
realistic assumptions with a view to ensuring the return of the insolvent 
or ailing enterprise within a reasonable period of time to long-term 
viability and without the enterprise significantly contributing itself to 
the costs of restructuring. This does not prevent the Parties from 
providing subsidies by way of temporary liquidity support in the form 
of loan guarantees or loans limited to the amount needed to merely 
keep an ailing enterprise in business for the time necessary to work out 
a restructuring or liquidation plan.  
This subparagraph does not apply to subsidies granted as 





On the purpose of the implementation of these regulations, both parties 
shall report annually to the other Party on the total amount, types and the 
sectoral distribution of subsidies which are specific and may affect international 
trade. Reporting should contain information concerning the objective, form, the 
amount or budget and where possible the recipient of the subsidy granted by a 
government or any public body.
99
 The Parties shall keep under constant review 
the matters to which reference is made in this section. When relevant problem 
occurs, each Party may refer such matters to the Trade Committee. The Parties 
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agree to review progress in implementing this section every two years after the 




5.4 Korea-EU SCM Dispute Cases 
 
The EU’s regulations on state aid seem to be more rigid than WTO 
rules on subsidies found in GATT and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
countervailing Measures. The cases of commercial vessels with Korea
101
 show 
that the way that the EU sees the granting of state aid, as a means to secure a 
competitive edge in its common market, can have an adverse effect on the 
markets outside the EU.
102
 Table 14 shows 4 SCM disputes occurred between 
Korea and the EU.  
 
Table 22. The Overall Korea-EU SCM Dispute Cases 
Complainant Respondent DS No. Issue Date 
     EU Korea DS273 Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels 21-Oct-02 
Korea EU DS299 Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips from Korea 25-Jul-03 
Korea EU DS301 Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels 03-Sep-03 
Korea EU DS307 Aid for Commercial Vessels 13-Feb-04 
Source: WTO 
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Recently, in the Korea Shipbuilding Case, the European shipbuilding 
industry alleged that Korean export subsidies and restructuring subsidies to the 
domestic shipbuilding industry constituted actionable subsidies that caused 
adverse trade effect to the European industry in violation of Art.3 and 5 of the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The case was 
brought to the WTO where the Panel agreed to the European shipbuilding 
industry concerning the export subsidies but did not consider that the parties 
had presented enough factual evidence to convince the Panel regarding the 
restructuring subsidies.
103
 A corresponding case was filed simultaneously by 
Korea claiming that the EU also violates the anti-subsidy Agreement by 
subsidizing the European shipbuilding industry. The Panel in this case rejected 
most of Korea’s complaints. However, the Panel found that the EU violate trade 
rules when it reacted unilaterally to Korean state aid by granting subsidies to 
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The trend of the EU complaints over 1995 through 2015 showed that a 
high level of ‘trade remedy’ action brought pursuant to the Anti-Dumping and 
SCM Agreements. Especially, regarding the SCM Agreement, the EU has been 
the second heaviest user of the WTO dispute settlement system during the same 
period. In this regard, the EU involved a total of 40 out of 109 cases, which 
constitute 36.7% of the total SCM disputes (23 cases as a complaining party 
and 17 cases as a respondent).  
Regionally, It is confirmed that the EU targeted countries in North 
America (nine cases for the United States and three cases for Canada), Central 
and South America (two cases for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico each) more 
than other regions. For these five countries, 18 disputes out of 23 disputes, 78.3% 
of total SCM disputes were complained by the EU. Conversely, the United 
States, Korea and Russia were major players who filed EU under the SCM 
agreement. During the same period, Korea involved in four SCM disputes with 
the EU and three cases of these were petitioned by Korea.  
It is quite clear that the EU, as a complainant, the most frequently 
debated issues with the WTO were agricultural food products, steel, 
automobiles and parts, and aircraft. For the agricultural food products, 
automobiles and parts, and steel products, four cases of each were filed, which 





category of aircraft followed previous subject matters. Three cases for this 
category were filed, comprising 13%. In summary, approximately 65% of the 
EU disputes concentrate on these products. On the other hand, the EU as a 
respondent, a total of four SCM disputes regarding agricultural food products 
were petitioned from other countries, comprising 23.5% of SCM disputes. Also, 
disputes on the product of aircraft, chemicals, energies, polyethylene and ships 
engaged two cases each, comprising 58.8% in total.  
The EU also initiates investigations on its own initiative in the EC. A 
total of 74 cases were targeted against 22 countries for initiations by the EU. 
The middle and low income countries, which include seven Asian countries and 
the most targeted group, were directed at 45 cases and 61% of the total EU 
initiation. In the group, India was targeted the most, followed by China. These 
two countries occupied 29 cases, which are about 40% of the EU initiations. 
Even among the high income countries, Asian countries such as Korea and 
Taiwan were the main targets in terms of the number of EU initiations. Overall, 
it is quite obvious that cases are heavily concentrated on the Asian countries. 
Regardless of the group of nations, a total of 59 cases were reported against the 
Asian countries, which constitute 80% of the initiations.  
The EU concluded a total of 35 measures on 74 initiations. More 
specifically, eight measures for the high income countries, 24 measures for 
middle and low income countries and the other three measures were imposed 
for the countries in the Middle East. The middle and low income countries, 





countervailing duties dominantly as compared to the other groups. In addition, 
18 measures, more than a half of the total countervailing measures were 
implemented for these two countries.  
Regarding the retaliated categories of product, eleven impositions of 
duties, comprising 45.8 % of the total measures of middle and low income 
countries were involved in steel and textile products. Most of the impositions of 
duties, eight measures particularly, were against India. The other three measures 
were targeted at Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Even these three 
countries were imposed duties for products related to steel and textiles. Overall, 
the EU presents a greater share of measures toward the steel and textile 
industries in regards to subsidy issues. 
The EU subsidy investigations on the basis of the WTO SCM 
Agreement and its own anti-subsidy rules showed clear specificity for both 
retaliated regions and products. As a result of the legal proceedings, the EU 
predominantly concluded ad-valorem duty rather than other measures. 
Traditionally, the EU has been considered subsidy-related issues as one of the 
critical concerns, both politically and economically. In recent years, the Korean 
government carrying out policies that support structural adjustment of 
industries and there exists a high probability of involvement with subsidy 
disputes. Thus, the government needs to consider its implications and pay more 











Ahn, Dukguen, ‘Analysis on the Implementation of the WTO Subsidy System’, 
Trade Remedy Review 31 (2008) 
 
Baffe, John, ‘Cotton Subsidies, the WTO, and the Cotton Problem’, The World 
Economy 34 (2011) 
 
Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, ‘Will International Rules on Subsidies 
Disrupt the World Trading System’, American Economic Review 96 (2006) 
 
Brander, James A. and Barbara J. Spencer, ‘Export Subsidies and International 
Market Share Rivalry’, Journal of International Economics 18 (1985) 
 
Bronckers, Mario, and Reinhard Quick, ‘What is a Countervailable Subsidy 
under EEC Trade Law’, Journal of World Trade 23.6 (1989) 
 
Collins-Williams, Terry, and Gerry Salembier, ‘International Disciplines of 
Subsidies: The GATT, the WTO and the Future Agenda’, Journal of World 






Franck, Thomas M., ‘On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International 
Law’, American Journal of International Law 102 (2008) 
 
Glen, David. ‘Shipbuilding disputes: the WTO panel rulings and the elimination 
of operating subsidy from shipbuilding’, Maritime Policy & Management 33.1 
(2006) 
 
Green, Andrew J. and Michael Trebilcock, ‘Enforcing WTO Obligations: What 
Can We Learn from Export Subsidies’, Journal of International Economic Law 
10 (2007) 
 
Hogan, Abby E. ‘Transatlantic Frenemies: Why US and EU Agricultural 
Subsidies are the Focus of WTO Trade Disputes’, Diss. Central European 
University (2012) 
 
Kara Leitner and Simon Lester, ‘WTO dispute settlement 1995-2010: A 
statistical analysis’, Journal of International Economic Law (2011) 
 
Kara Leitner and Simon Lester, ‘WTO dispute settlement 1995-2013: A 
statistical analysis’, Journal of International Economic Law (2014) 
 
Laird, Sam, ‘A round by any other name: the WTO agenda after Doha’, 





Lin, Tsai-Yu, ‘Remedies for Export Subsidies in the Context of Article 4 of the 
SCM Agreement: Rethinking Some Persistent Issues’, Asian Journal of WTO & 
International Health Law and Policy 3 (2008) 
 
O'Brien, Alice, ‘Countervailing Low Wage Subsidies: A Counter to the 
Leveling of Labor Conditions’, Transnational Law & Comtemporary Problems 
4 (1994) 
 
Pesaresi, Nicola, Clemens Kerle, and Anna Jarosz-Friis, ‘EU-Korea FTA: a new 
frontier for a global level playing field in subsidies control’, Competition policy 
newsletter 1 (2010) 
 
Robert O’Brian, ‘Subsidies and State Transformation in North America: The 
GATT and The EU’, Macmillan Press (1997) 
 
Rovegno, Laura, and Hylke Vandenbussche, ‘A comparative analysis of EU 
Antidumping rules and application’, Institute for Economic and Social Research 
(IRES) Discussion Paper (23), Louvain la Neuve (2011) 
 
Steenblik, Ronald P, ‘Previous multilateral efforts to discipline subsidies to 
natural resource based industries’, Report of proceedings on workshop on the 
impact of government financial transfers on fisheries management, resource 






Steger, Debra P, ‘The WTO Doha Round Negotiations on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures: Issues for Negotiators’, Symposium on Economic 
Restructuring in Korea In Light of the Doha Development Round Negotiations 
on Rules, Seoul, Korea (2003) 
 
Steger, Debra P, ‘The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement: 
Ahead of its Time or Time for Reform’, Journal of World Trade 44.4 (2010) 
 
Sumner, Daniel A, ‘Agricultural subsidy programs’, The Concise Encyclopedia 
of Economics, Library of Economics and Liberty (2008) 
 
Sykes, Alan O, ‘The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A 

















Adamantopoulos, Konstantinos, and María J. Pereyra-Friedrichsen, EU Anti-
Subsidy Law and Practice, Sweet & Maxwell (2007) 
 
Bacchetta, Marc, and Michele Ruta, The WTO, Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, Edward Elgar (2011) 
 
Barcelo, John J, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the 
Tokyo Round, Cornell Int'l LJ 13 (1980) 
 
Bellis, Jean-François, EU Anti-dumping and Other Trade Defence Instruments, 
Kluwer Law International (2011) 
 
Benitah, Marc, The law of subsidies under the GATT/WTO system, Kluwer Law 
International (2001) 
 
Biondi, Andrea, Piet Eeckhout, and James Flynn, eds. The law of state aid in 
the European Union, Oxford University Press (2004) 
 
De Madrid, Gustavo E. Luengo Hernández, Regulation of subsidies and state 
aids in WTO and EC law: conflicts in international trade law Vol. 55, Kluwer 






Harrison, James eds. The European Union and South Korea: The Legal 
Framework for Strengthening Trade, Economic and Political Relations, 
Edinburgh University Press (2013) 
 
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Subsidy issues after the Tokyo round, Trade Policy in 
the 1980s, Washington (1983) 
 
Luengo, Gustavo, Regulation of subsidies and state aids in WTO and EC law, 
Kluwer Law International (2006) 
 
McGovern, Edmond, International trade regulation Vol. 2, Globefield Press 
(2014) 
 
Maclean, Robert Macdonald, EU trade barrier regulation: tackling unfair 
foreign trade practices, Sweet & Maxwell (2006) 
 
Rubini, Luca, The definition of subsidy and state aid: WTO and EC law in 
comparative perspective, Oxford University Press (2009) 
 
Snyder, Francis, The EU, the WTO and China: legal pluralism and 






Wolfrum, Rüdiger, Peter-Tobias Stoll, and Michael Koebele, eds. WTO: Trade 
Remedies Vol. 4, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and 

































                                            
105
 Maclean, Robert Macdonald, ‘The EU trade barrier regulation: tackling unfair foreign trade 






Appendix II. The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure 
 
Time Scale Actions 
  
60 days  Consultations, mediation, etc  
45 days  Panel set up and panellists appointed  
6 months  Final panel report to parties  
3 weeks  Final panel report to WTO members  
60 days  
Dispute Settlement Body adopts report  
(if no appeal)  
Total = 1 year  (without appeal)  
60 to 90 days  Appeals report  
30 days  Dispute Settlement Body adopts appeals report  
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Appendix IV. Harmonized System Section Headings 
 
Section Description 
I Live Animals; Animal Products 
II Vegetable Products 
III Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils and Their Cleavage Products; Prepared Edible 
Fats; Animal or Vegetable Waxes 
IV Prepared Foodstuffs; Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar; Tobacco and Manufactured 
Tobacco Substitutes 
V Mineral Products 
VI Products of the Chemical or Allied Industries 
VII Plastics and Articles Thereof; Rubber and Articles Thereof 
VIII Raw Hides and Skins, Leather, Furskins and Articles Thereof; Sadderly and 
Harness; Travel Goods, Handbags and Similar Containers; Articles of Animal Gut 
(Other than Silk-Worm Gut) 
IX Wood and Articles of Wood; Wood Charcoal; Cork and Articles of Cork; 
Manufactures of Straw, of Esparto or of Other Plaiting Materials; Basketware and 
Wickerwork 
X Pulp Of  Wood or of Other Fibrous Cellulosic Material; Recovered (Waste and 
Scrap) Paper or Paperboard; Paper and Paperboard and Articles Thereof 
XI Textiles and Textile Articles 
XII Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas, Sun Umbrellas, Walking-Sticks, Seat-Sticks, 
Whips, Riding-Crops and Parts Thereof; Prepared Feathers and Articles Made 
Therewith; Artificial Flowers; Articles of Human Hair 
XIII Articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement, Asbestos, Mica or Similar Materials; Ceramic 
Products; Glass and Glassware 
XIV Natural or Cultured Pearls, Precious or Semi-Precious Stones, Precious Metals, 
Metals Clad with Precious Metal and Articles Thereof; Imitation Jewellery; Coin 
Thereof; Imitation Jewellery; Coin 
XV Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal 
XVI Machinery and Mechanical Appliances; Electrical Equipment; Parts Thereof; Sound 
Recorders and Reproducers, Television Image and Sound Recorders and 
Reproducers, and Parts and Accessories of Such Articles 
XVII Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and Associated Transport Equipment 
XVIII Optical, Photographic, Cinematographic, Measuring, Checking, Precision, Medical 
or Surgical Instruments and Apparatus; Clocks and Watches; Musical Instruments; 
Parts and Accessories Thereof 
XIX Arms and Ammunition; Parts and Accessories Thereof 
XX Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 








Appendix V. List of SCM Disputes of EU (formerly EC) as a Complainant 
 
DS54 Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 3 October 1996 
DS81 Brazil - Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector, 7 May 1997  
 DS108 United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, 18 November 1997  
 DS138 United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and  
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, 12 June 1998   
 
DS142 Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, 17 August 1998  
 DS145 Argentina - Countervailing Duties on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European 
Communities, 23 September 1998  
 
DS147 Japan - Tariff Quotas and Subsidies Affecting Leather, 8 October 1998  
 DS212 United States - Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the 
European Communities, 10 November 2000  
 
DS213 United States - Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from Germany, 10 November 2000  
 
DS217 United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 21 December 2000  
 DS262 United States - Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Steel Products from France and Germany, Korea, Republic of - Measures Affecting 
Trade in Commercial Vessels, 25 July 2002  
 
 
DS273 Korea, Republic of - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, 21 October 2002  
 DS314 Mexico - Provisional Countervailing Measures on Olive Oil from the European 
Communities, 18 August 2004  
 
DS317 United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 6 October 2004  
 DS330 Argentina - Countervailing Duties on Olive Oil, Wheat Gluten and Peaches, 
29 April 2005  
 
DS339 China - Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, 30 March 2006  
 DS341 Mexico - Definitive Countervailing Measures on Olive Oil from the European 
Communities, 31 March 2006  
 
DS353 United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft - Second Complaint, 
27 June 2005  
 






DS380 India - Certain Taxes and Other Measures on Imported Wines and Spirits, 
22 September 2008  
 
DS426 Canada - Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, 11 August 2011  
 DS472 Brazil - Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and Charges, 19 December 2013  

































Appendix VI. List of SCM Disputes of EU (formerly EC) as a Respondent 
 
DS104  EC - Measures Affecting the Exportation of Processed Cheese, 8 October 1997  
DS172  
EC - Measures Relating to the Development of a Flight Management System,  
21 May 1999  
DS265  EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, 27 September 2002  
DS266  EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, 27 September 2002  
DS283  EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, 14 March 2003  
DS299  
EC - Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access Memory Chips from Korea, 
25 July 2003  
DS301  EC - Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, 3 September 2003  
DS307  EC - Aid for Commercial Vessels, 13 February 2004  
DS316  
EC and Certain Member States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,  
6 October 2004  
DS347  EC and Certain Member States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft 
(Second Complaint), 31 January 2006  
DS385  EC - Expiry Reviews of Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties Imposed on Imports of 
PET from India, 4 December 2008  
DS452  EU and Certain Member States - Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector, 5 November 2012  
DS459  EU - Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures 
Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, 15 May 2013  
DS474  EU – Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports 
from Russia, 23 December 2013  
DS476  EU - Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector, 30 April 2014  
DS486 
EU - Countervailing Measures on Certain Polyethylene terephthalate from Pakistan,  
5 November 2014 
DS494 
EU- Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports 











Appendix VII. Chronology of trade dispute between Korea and EU (DS273)107 
 
1 21-Oct-02 EU requests consultations under article 4 of Dispute Settlement  
Understanding (DSU) and articles 4, 7, 30 of the agreement on subsidies 
and countervailing measures (SCM Agreement) affecting trade in 




2 22-Nov-02 EU Korea meetings fail to resolve issue 7 May 2003  
3 11-Jun-03 EU requests establishment of a panel  
4 10-Jul-03 EU makes second request—triggers panel process  
5 21-Jul-03 DSB established panel in accordance with Article 6 of DSU—standard 
terms of reference agreed Information gathering process started— no 
agreement between parties so designated by DSB  
  
  
6 11-Aug-03 EU requests Director-General to name a panel  
(no agreement between EU and Korea on panel members)  
  
7 20-Aug-03 Panel members named  
8 19-Sep-03 60-day period for information gathering over; extended by mutual 
consent to November  
  
9 10-Nov-03 Initial report by designated representative to Panel  
10 09-Mar-04 Panel holds two day meetings with parties  
11 11-Apr-04 Original panel chair dies  
12 11-May-04 New chair appointed by DG  
13 17-Jun-04 Panel holds second 2 day meeting with parties  
14 24-Nov-04 Interim Report submitted to parties  
15 22-Dec-04 Final Report submitted to parties  
16 11-Apr-05 Panel Report adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body  
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Appendix VIII. Chronology of trade dispute between Korea and EU (DS301)108 
 
1 03-Sep-03 Korea requests consultations with EU over its TDM  
2 12-Sep-03 China asks to be joined in the consultations  
3 09-Oct-03 EU and Korea meet  
4 14-Nov-03 Fail to resolve issue  
5 05-Feb-04 Korea requests a Panel be set up  
6 19-Mar-04 Terms of reference for Panel agreed  
7 07-May-04 Korea requests DG to determine composition of Panel  
8 13-May-04 DG appoints panel members  
China, Japan and USA reserve rights to be third parties  
  
9 03-Aug-04 Panel holds two day meetings with parties  
10 05-Oct-04 Panel holds one day meeting with parties  
11 23-Dec-04 Interim report submitted to parties  
12 10-Feb-05 Final report submitted to parties  
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Appendix IX. Breakdown of SCM Disputes by Article 
 
Article 1  28 case(s): DS54, DS59, DS64, DS167, DS172, DS173, DS212, DS218, 
DS222, DS236, DS257, DS273, DS296, DS299, DS301, DS307, DS316, 
DS330, DS336, DS341, DS345, DS347, DS368, DS379, DS436, DS451, 
DS486, DS487  
 
Article 1.1  11 case(s): DS194, DS212, DS266, DS336, DS353, DS412, DS426, 
DS437, DS452, DS459, DS464  
 
Article 1.1(a)  3 case(s): DS236, DS451, DS486  
Article 1.1(a)(1)  1 case(s): DS437  
Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)  2 case(s): DS486, DS487  
Article 1.1(b)  5 case(s): DS138, DS236, DS437, DS451, DS487  
Article 1.2  2 case(s): DS236, DS464  
Article 2  22 case(s): DS54, DS59, DS167, DS172, DS173, DS236, DS257, DS273, 
DS296, DS299, DS301, DS307, DS316, DS336, DS347, DS353, DS368, 
DS379, DS436, DS437, DS451, DS487  
Article 2.1  4 case(s): DS357, DS451, DS464, DS491 
Article 2.1(c)  1 case(s): DS491 
Article 2.2  
2 case(s): DS451, DS464  
 Article 2.3  5 case(s): DS64, DS357, DS451, DS459, DS487  
Article 3  35 case(s): DS46, DS51, DS52, DS57, DS59, DS64, DS65, DS70, DS81, 
DS103, DS104, DS106, DS126, DS127, DS128, DS129, DS130, DS131, 
DS139, DS222, DS236, DS267, DS283, DS307, DS339, DS340, DS342, 
DS358, DS359, DS387, DS388, DS390, DS419, DS476, DS486  
 
Article 3.1  10 case(s): DS266, DS273, DS283, DS301, DS316, DS317, DS353, 
DS354, DS357, DS365  
 
Article 3.1(a)  12 case(s): DS70, DS108, DS126, DS139, DS142, DS236, DS265, DS347, 
DS357, DS451, DS486, DS489  
 





DS347, DS358, DS359, DS380, DS412, DS426, DS451, DS452, DS456, 
DS459, DS472, DS487, DS497  
Article 3.2  27 case(s): DS70, DS139, DS142, DS265, DS266, DS273, DS283, DS316, 
DS317, DS340, DS342, DS347, DS353, DS354, DS357, DS358, DS359, 
DS365, DS380, DS412, DS426, DS452, DS456, DS459, DS487, DS489, 
DS497 
 
Article 4  2 case(s): DS301, DS347  
Article 4.2  3 case(s): DS357, DS380, DS451  
Article 4.10  1 case(s): DS217  
Article 5  14 case(s): DS64, DS71, DS81, DS172, DS173, DS234, DS267, DS273, 
DS301, DS307, DS316, DS317, DS353, DS357  
 
Article 5(a)  1 case(s): DS347  
Article 5(b)  1 case(s): DS459  
Article 5(c)  4 case(s): DS347, DS451, DS456, DS459  
Article 6  9 case(s): DS54, DS59, DS64, DS147, DS172, DS173, DS267, DS307, 
DS379  
 
Article 6.3  6 case(s): DS273, DS301, DS316, DS317, DS353, DS357  
Article 6.3(a)  3 case(s): DS347, DS456, DS459  
Article 6.3(b) 2 case(s): DS347, DS451  
Article 6.3(c)  3 case(s): DS347, DS451, DS456  
Article 6.4  3 case(s): DS301, DS316, DS451  
Article 6.5  3 case(s): DS273, DS301, DS451  
Article 7  3 case(s): DS64, DS301, DS347  
Article 7.2  2 case(s): DS357, DS451  
Article 7.9  1 case(s): DS217  
Article 9  1 case(s): DS379  
Article 10  40 case(s): DS138, DS145, DS167, DS194, DS206, DS212, DS213, 
DS217, DS218, DS221, DS234, DS236, DS257, DS262, DS277, DS280, 
DS296, DS299, DS310, DS311, DS314, DS330, DS336, DS338, DS341, 
DS345, DS368, DS379, DS414, DS427, DS436, DS437, DS440, DS449, 
DS464, DS470, DS474, DS486, DS491, DS494 
 





DS299, DS330, DS336, DS341, DS436, DS437  
Article 11.1  3 case(s): DS167, DS427, DS437  
Article 11.2  4 case(s): DS167, DS314, DS414, DS437  
Article 11.3  5 case(s): DS167, DS314, DS414, DS437, DS440  
Article 11.4  5 case(s): DS167, DS217, DS234, DS314, DS440  
Article 11.5  1 case(s): DS167  
Article 11.9  3 case(s): DS213, DS295, DS314  
Article 11.11  2 case(s): DS145, DS470  
Article 12  9 case(s): DS257, DS262, DS296, DS299, DS330, DS336, DS341, DS379, 
DS436  
 
Article 12.1  1 case(s): DS385  
Article 12.1.1  1 case(s): DS295  
Article 12.3  2 case(s): DS414, DS427  
Article 12.4.1  3 case(s): DS414, DS427, DS440  
Article 12.5  2 case(s): DS295, DS385  
Article 12.6  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 12.7  7 case(s): DS295, DS385, DS414, DS427, DS437, DS440, DS491 
Article 12.8  4 case(s): DS414, DS427, DS440, DS486  
Article 13  4 case(s): DS112, DS341, DS379, DS436  
Article 13.1  1 case(s): DS167  
Article 14  17 case(s): DS138, DS212, DS218, DS236, DS257, DS280, DS296, 
DS299, DS330, DS336, DS341, DS345, DS368, DS379, DS436, DS464, 
DS486   
Article 14(b)  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 14(d)  2 case(s): DS437, DS491  
Article 15  11 case(s): DS206, DS257, DS262, DS296, DS299, DS314, DS336, 
DS338, DS341, DS436, DS449  
 
Article 15.1  5 case(s): DS277, DS310, DS414, DS427, DS440  
Article 15.2  6 case(s): DS277, DS310, DS338, DS414, DS427, DS440  
Article 15.3  1 case(s): DS277  
Article 15.4  5 case(s): DS277, DS310, DS338, DS427, DS440  






Article 15.7  2 case(s): DS277, DS491  
Article 15.8  1 case(s): DS277  
Article 16  2 case(s): DS314, DS341  
Article 16.1  2 case(s): DS427, DS440  
Article 17  8 case(s): DS194, DS236, DS295, DS296, DS299, DS314, DS338, DS368  
Article 17.1  1 case(s): DS345  
Article 17.1(b)  1 case(s): DS236  
Article 17.2  1 case(s): DS345  
Article 17.4  1 case(s): DS345  
Article 17.5  2 case(s): DS236, DS345  
Article 18  2 case(s): DS217, DS234  
Article 18.4  1 case(s): DS470  
Article 19  17 case(s): DS194, DS212, DS218, DS236, DS257, DS280, DS295, 
DS296, DS299, DS330, DS336, DS341, DS379, DS414, DS436, DS449, 
DS486   
Article 19.1  5 case(s): DS212, DS310, DS311, DS336, DS486  
Article 19.2  
1 case(s): DS221  
 Article 19.3  6 case(s): DS212, DS236, DS295, DS311, DS345, DS486  
Article 19.4  9 case(s): DS138, DS212, DS221, DS236, DS311, DS336, DS345, DS427, 
DS464  
 
Article 20  1 case(s): DS236  
Article 20.6  2 case(s): DS236, DS295  
Article 21  12 case(s): DS212, DS213, DS218, DS236, DS257, DS262, DS280, 
DS295, DS330, DS336, DS436, DS449  
 
Article 21.1  5 case(s): DS212, DS221, DS236, DS295, DS311  
Article 21.2  4 case(s): DS212, DS236, DS295, DS311  
Article 21.3  2 case(s): DS212, DS385  
Article 21.4  2 case(s): DS311, DS385  
Article 22  8 case(s): DS206, DS257, DS277, DS296, DS299, DS336, DS341, DS436  





Article 22.3  4 case(s): DS414, DS427, DS440, DS486  
Article 22.4  3 case(s): DS338, DS427, DS486  
Article 22.5  3 case(s): DS414, DS427, DS440  
Article 25  1 case(s): DS456  
Article 25.1  2 case(s): DS419, DS450  
Article 25.2  2 case(s): DS419, DS450  
Article 25.3  2 case(s): DS419, DS450  
Article 25.4  2 case(s): DS419, DS450  
Article 27  4 case(s): DS46, DS59, DS81, DS206 
Article 27.2  1 case(s): DS51  
Article 27.4  4 case(s): DS46, DS51, DS52, DS65  
Article 27.5  1 case(s): DS46  
Article 28.2  3 case(s): DS55, DS59, DS64  
Article 30  1 case(s): DS437  
Article 32  14 case(s): DS234, DS236, DS257, DS262, DS296, DS299, DS301, 
DS341, DS353, DS368, DS379, DS436, DS449, DS486  
 
Article 32.1  18 case(s): DS194, DS217, DS221, DS234, DS236, DS277, DS295, 
DS296, DS299, DS301, DS310, DS311, DS336, DS345, DS437, DS470, 
DS474, DS494   
Article 32.2  1 case(s): DS221  
Article 32.3  1 case(s): DS221  
Article 32.5  10 case(s): DS194, DS212, DS213, DS217, DS221, DS234, DS236, 
DS345, DS385, DS470  
 
Annex I  1 case(s): DS486  
Annex II  1 case(s): DS486  
Annex III  1 case(s): DS486  
Annex VI  1 case(s): DS486  









Appendix X. Breakdown of SCM Disputes by Article (EU as a complainant) 
 
Article 1  6 case(s): DS54, DS212, DS273, DS330, DS341, DS487 
Article 1.1  3 case(s): DS212, DS353, DS426 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)  1 case(s): DS487 
Article 1.1(b)  2 case(s): DS138, DS487 
Article 2  4 case(s): DS54, DS273, DS353, DS487 
Article 2.3  1 case(s): DS487 
Article 3  2 case(s): DS81, DS339 
Article 3.1  4 case(s): DS273, DS317, DS353, DS354 
Article 3.1(a)  2 case(s): DS108, DS142 
Article 3.1(b)  7 case(s): DS54, DS108, DS142, DS380, DS426, DS472, DS487 
Article 3.2  8 case(s): DS142, DS273, DS317, DS353, DS354, DS380, DS426, DS487 
Article 4.2  1 case(s): DS380 
Article 4.10  1 case(s): DS217 
Article 5  4 case(s): DS81, DS273, DS317, DS353 
Article 6  2 case(s): DS54, DS147 
Article 6.3  3 case(s): DS273, DS317, DS353 
Article 6.5  1 case(s): DS273 
Article 7.9  1 case(s): DS217 
Article 10  9 case(s): DS138, DS145, DS212, DS213, DS217, DS262, DS314, DS330, 
DS341 
 
Article 11  3 case(s): DS262, DS330, DS341 
Article 11.2  1 case(s): DS314 
Article 11.3  1 case(s): DS314 
Article 11.4  2 case(s): DS217, DS314 
Article 11.9  2 case(s): DS213, DS314 
Article 11.11  1 case(s): DS145 





Article 13  1 case(s): DS341 
Article 14  4 case(s): DS138, DS212, DS330, DS341 
Article 15  3 case(s): DS262, DS314, DS341 
Article 16  2 case(s): DS314, DS341 
Article 17  1 case(s): DS314 
Article 18  1 case(s): DS217 
Article 19  3 case(s): DS212, DS330, DS341 
Article 19.1  
1 case(s): DS212 
 Article 19.3  1 case(s): DS212 
Article 19.4  2 case(s): DS138, DS212 
Article 21  4 case(s): DS212, DS213, DS262, DS330 
Article 21.1  1 case(s): DS212 
Article 21.2  1 case(s): DS212 
Article 21.3  1 case(s): DS212 
Article 22  1 case(s): DS341 
Article 27  1 case(s): DS81 
Article 32  3 case(s): DS262, DS341, DS353 
Article 32.1  1 case(s): DS217 
Article 32.5  3 case(s): DS212, DS213, DS217 















Appendix XI. Breakdown of SCM Disputes by Article (EU as a respondent) 
 
Article 1  7 case(s): DS172, DS299, DS301, DS307, DS316, DS347, DS486 
Article 1.1  3 case(s): DS266, DS452, DS459 
Article 1.1(a)  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 2  6 case(s): DS172, DS299, DS301, DS307, DS316, DS347 
Article 2.3  1 case(s): DS459  
Article 3  5 case(s): DS104, DS283, DS307, DS476, DS486 
Article 3.1  4 case(s): DS266, DS283, DS301, DS316 
Article 3.1(a)  3 case(s): DS265, DS347, DS486 
Article 3.1(b)  3 case(s): DS347, DS452, DS459 
Article 3.2  7 case(s): DS265, DS266, DS283, DS316, DS347, DS452, DS459 
Article 4  2 case(s): DS301, DS347  
Article 5  4 case(s): DS172, DS301, DS307, DS316 
Article 5(a)  1 case(s): DS347  
Article 5(b)  1 case(s): DS459  
Article 5(c)  2 case(s): DS347, DS459 
Article 6  2 case(s): DS172, DS307 
Article 6.3  2 case(s): DS301, DS316 
Article 6.3(a)  2 case(s): DS347, DS459  
Article 6.3(b) 1 case(s): DS347  
Article 6.3(c)  1 case(s): DS347  
Article 6.4  2 case(s): DS301, DS316 
Article 6.5  1 case(s): DS301 
Article 7  2 case(s): DS301, DS347  
Article 10  3 case(s): DS299, DS474, DS486 





Article 12  1 case(s): DS299 
Article 12.1  1 case(s): DS385  
Article 12.5  1 case(s): DS385  
Article 12.6  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 12.7  1 case(s): DS385 
Article 12.8  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 14  2 case(s): DS299, DS486  
Article 14(b)  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 15  1 case(s): DS299 
Article 15.5  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 17  1 case(s): DS299  
Article 19  2 case(s): DS299, DS486  
Article 19.1  
1 case(s): DS486  
 Article 19.3  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 21.3  1 case(s): DS385  
Article 21.4  1 case(s): DS385  
Article 22  1 case(s): DS299  
Article 22.3  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 22.4  1 case(s): DS486  
Article 32  3 case(s): DS299, DS301, DS486  
Article 32.1  1 case(s): DS299, DS301, DS474 
Article 32.5  1 case(s): DS385 
Annex I  1 case(s): DS486  
Annex II  1 case(s): DS486  
Annex III  1 case(s): DS486  
Annex VI  1 case(s): DS486  











보조금은 WTO 체제 하에서 대표적인 비관세장벽으로써 간주되어 논
란의 대상이 되어왔다. EU는 WTO하 발생한 총 109건의 보조금과 상계조치
에 관한 무역분쟁 중, 40건이 제소국 또는 피소국으로 연루된 것으로 나타났
다. 이는 총 64건이 연루된 미국 다음으로 높은 수치이며, 보조금관련 무역
분쟁에 있어서 세계에서 두 번째로 많은 분쟁건수를 기록하고 있다. 따라서, 
본 연구는 WTO체제가 확립된 1995년부터 2015년까지의 통계적 분석을 통
하여 EU의 보조금과 상계조치를 통한 무역구제 행위의 메커니즘에 대하여 
설명한다. 
본 연구는 기본적으로 WTO, European Commission (EC)의 통계자료와 
보고서 및 기존의 선행연구들을 바탕으로 진행되었다. 우선 WTO의 보조금 
및 상계조치에 관한 협정하 EU의 보조금관련 무역분쟁이 특정국가 또는 특
정제품에 집중되어 있는지 살펴보았다. 또한 EC의 보조금 금지법을 바탕으
로 자체적으로 조사개시 및 상계관세가 부과된 분쟁들에 대해서도 독립적으
로 특정성과 부과된 상계조치의 특성에 대하여 조사하였다. 그 결과, EU의 
보조금관련 무역분쟁은 분쟁 대상이 된 국가와 제품의 특정성에 있어서 상
당히 유의미한 상관관계를 보이는 것으로 조사되었다. 또한, 상계조치는 분
쟁의 대상이 된 제품의 특성에 따라 종량세보다는 종가세가 압도적인 숫자
로 부과된 것을 확인 할 수 있었다. 
궁극적으로 이 논문은 위의 분석을 통하여 1) WTO와 EC의 반 보조금 
협정 및 관련 조항에 대한 이해, 2) WTO와 EC를 통한 EU의 보조금과 상계
조치에 관한 무역분쟁의 조사개시 및 상계조치의 특정성 확인, 3) 무역상대





다. 본 논문의 실제 분쟁사례분석을 토대로 한 결론은 분쟁들의 내외부적 
배경을 이해하는데도 도움이 될 것이며, 한-EU FTA 파트너이자 한국의 세 
번째 무역상대인 EU와 보조금 관련, 추가적인 무역분쟁을 예측하는데도 기
여 할 것이다.  
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